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COMMENTS
CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTRAFAMILY
EAVESDROPPING IN ILLINOIS:
CAVEATS TO COMPREHENSIVE
REMEDIAL WEAPONRY
INTRODUCTION

Eavesdropping 1 is an ancient practice which at old common
law was condemned as a nuisance and punishable as a criminal
offense. 2 At that time, eavesdroppers "listened by the naked ear
under the eaves of houses, or their windows, or beyond their
walls, seeking private discourse. ' 3 The contemporary advent of
sophisticated mechanical devices transformed covert surveil-

lance into a potent privacy invader which has spawned litigation
regarding law enforcement and national security, 4 industrial espionage,5 and invasions of privacy by communications common
1. "Eavesdropping" is the practice of listening secretly to the private
conversations of others. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 411 (1976). Contemporary eavesdropping, with which this
comment is concerned, refers to surveillance that is aided by electronic or
mechanical devices. See J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTROIC SURVEILLANCE 2
(1977) [hereinafter cited as THE LAW OF ELECTROmC SURVEILLANCE].
"Wiretapping" and "bugging" are the most prevalent methods of intercepting communications. A "wiretap" involves a connection to a wire, usually a telephone line, of a device capable of intercepting or recording
conversations transmitted thereon. Id. A "bug" is a miniature electronic
device which overhears or records a speaker's conversations. Id. See generally 29 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 591 (1972 &Supp. 1978) (includes discussion of mechanical and engineering aspects of electronic surveillance and
an exhaustive legal bibliography on eavesdropping of all varieties); H.
SCHWARTZ, TAPS, BUGS, AND FOOLING THE PEOPLE (1977).
2. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45 (1967).
3. E. LAPIDUS, EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL].

4. For discussions of present constitutional aspects of the use of surveillance equipment in law enforcement contexts, see McNamara, The Problem of Surreptitious Entry to Effectuate Electronic Eavesdrops, 15 AM.
CRim. L. REv. 1 (1977); Note, Placementof Pen Registers By Telephone Company Following Court Order, 16 AM. CRhI. L.REV. 111 (1977); Note, Judicial
Sealing of Tape Recordings Under Title III, 15 AM. CiuM. L.REV. 89 (1977).
For an overview of problems involved in national security eavesdropping, see EAVESDROPPING ON TRIAL, supra note 3, at 96. The most recent
judicial treatment of this sub-area is Smith v. Nixon, No. 78-1526 (D.C. Cir.
July 12, 1979) (civil suit initiated to remedy governmental interception of
plaintiff's communications; entry of summary judgment for defendants reversed on appeal).
5. In industrial espionage cases, eavesdropping occurs when surveil-
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carriers.6 While the prevalence of these eavesdropping activities is recognized, authorities indicate that the most common
background for electronic surveillance in the United States is
marital discord.7 Nevertheless, the issue, whether family members possess a remediable right of individual privacy to be free
from intrafamily interceptions of their telephonic and other
communications, is of recent origin. Judicial treatment has not
been uniform. 8
The most readily discernible feature of modern eavesdropping is its propensity for eliciting a wide array of judicial response. Surveillance has been approved under certain
circumstances, most notably in law enforcement contexts. 9 In
non-criminal settings, it has been justified by the urgency of the
situation.10 But others have branded it a "dirty business" which
should not be allowed to indiscriminately invade privacy." Indeed, eavesdropping problems have long rested on this delicate
balance between expediency and personal privacy interests.
While family members have zones of protectable constitutional
privacy created apart from their familial relationships, 12 nonlance devices are employed in order to obtain business secrets. See generally THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC

SURVEILLANCE,

supra note 1, at 25. Another

important aspect of industrial eavesdropping occurs, however, where a
company intercepts communications of employees who are believed to be
leaking confidential information to the company's competitors. See, e.g.,
Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 455 F. Supp. 179 (N.D. Ga. 1978). See also
Bianco v. American Broadcasting Cos., 470 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. 111. 1979).
6. See, e.g., State v. Dwyer, 120 Ariz. 291, 585 P.2d 900 (1978) (reversed
murder conviction for failure to exclude evidence obtained by telephone operator who listened to defendant's conversations over a long period of
time); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Ashley, 563 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978) (civil suit for damages for intercepting confidential communications).
7. NATIONAL LAWYERS GuILD, RAISING AND LITIGATING ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE CLAIMS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 2.4(c) (1) (1977) (authors docu-

ment their claim that an enterprising amateur eavesdropper can purchase
electronic voice-activated recording devices for as little as forty dollars);
Comment, InterspousalElectronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 TOL. L. REV.
185, 211 (1975) (eighty percent of eavesdropping complaints involve family
disputes) [hereinafter cited as Interspousal Surveillance Immunity].

8. See In re Marriage of Lopp, 378 N.E.2d 414 (Ind.1978), cert. denied,99
S. Ct. 1023 (1979) (citing cases in direct conflict). See note 210 infra.

9. See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 99 S.Ct. 1682 (1979).
10. See Stamatiou v. United States Gypsum Co., 400 F. Supp. 431 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), affd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976) (necessity in protecting corporate
profits from extortion attempt justified technically illegal eavesdropping);
Beaber v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974), ajd, No. 4187,
Ohio App., 5th Dist., Aug. 4, 1975 (inability to gather evidence by other
means justified unlawful interceptions of communications).
11. E.g., White v. Weiss, 535 F.2d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir. 1976); Commonwealth v. Murray, 423 Pa. 37, 50, 223 A.2d 102, 109 (1966) (paraphrasing early
privacy opinions confronted with government wiretapping); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Id. at 475
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
12. "[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity.... but an asso-
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Civil Aspects

governmental invasions do not impinge upon federal constitu-

tional privacy rights. Instead, these personal privacy infringements, including eavesdropping in domestic relations contexts,
13
have been purportedly reserved to the province of the states.
All but a few jurisdictions have legislatively utilized this power
14
in enacting anti-eavesdropping statutes.
The preliminary portions of this comment will examine the
general development of sanctions against eavesdropping in Illinois, and the manner in which these prohibitions have been
supplemented by federal legislation. Scrutiny will then be narrowed to "intrafamily interceptions of communications through
16
eavesdropping"'15 and the rights and possible rebuttals to civil
causes of action for damages and injunctive relief cognizable
under Illinois and federal law. Supplementary thereto will be
an extrapolation of competing concerns regarding demands, in
divorce and child custody disputes, for exclusion of evidence obtained through unlawful eavesdropping. An important issue underlying the entire discussion is whether the family should be
ciation of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual. . . ." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
13. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
14. Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wyoming do not statutorily proscribe wiretapping or eavesdropping. The
National Law Journal, Apr. 16, 1979, at 26. For exhaustive lists of state
eavesdropping legislation, see notes 59-60 infra.
15. "Intrafamily interceptions of communications through eavesdropping" descriptively reduces the scope of this comment. The term "eavesdropping" refers to Illinois legislation prohibiting such practices. See note
20 infra. The phrase "interceptions of communications" is utilized in federal statutes and the 1970 Illinois Constitution. See text accompanying
notes 31-33 & 37-43 infra. While the language of the invasion of privacy section of the Illinois Constitution seems to encompass visual surveillance, the
focus of this comment will be on aural acquisitions of communications. The
Illinois and federal statutory sanctions on aural acquisitions have been held
not to include implied bans on the covert use of photographic equipment.
See Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Cos., 60 111. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d
126 (1978); Sponick v. Detroit Police Dep't., 49 Mich. App. 162, 211 N.W.2d 674
(1973).
"Intrafamily" refers to the immediate family bonds of spouses and parent-child. While various fact situations are addressed by this comment, two
introductory examples are: (1) the attachment of an eavesdropping device
to a telephone or the placing of a "room bug" by one spouse, without the
other's knowledge, in order to discover marital infidelity or grounds for divorce, and (2) the attachment of a recording device to a telephone by a custodial parent to enable interception of conversations between his estranged
or former spouse and the parties' child.
16. Criminal prosecution aspects of eavesdropping will not be dealt
with, except when necessary for comparative purposes. The usual prerequisite for statutory civil recovery, however, is civil proof of a violation of
criminal eavesdropping provisions. Stamatiou v. United States Gypsum
Co., 400 F. Supp. 431, 436 (N.D. Ill. 1975), affd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976).
See generally Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 855 (1960 & Supp. 1978) (addresses state
legislation making wiretapping a criminal offense).
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treated as an association of separate individuals or as a single
entity, thereby qualifying rights to individual privacy.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL RECOVERY FOR UNLAWFUL
EAVESDROPPING IN ILLINOIS

Realizing their potential for invading the privacy of human
conversation, various jurisdictions, with Illinois at the forefront,
legislatively outlawed employment of wiretaps and other
mechanical eavesdropping equipment. In 1895, the initial Illinois anti-wiretapping statute was enacted. This legislation, with
minor amendments in language, served this state until 1957.17
At that time, the General Assembly, in attempting to keep pace
with technological advancements, expanded the eavesdropping
ban beyond taps on telephone lines to encompass the use of all
electronic devices. The term "electronic" was dropped in 1961,
as it was believed that even that modifier might create an exception to the eavesdropping prohibition. The crux of the latter
statutory scheme is in effect today.
The present Illinois statute 18 purports to be an absolute ban
on private surveillance. 19 It developed the common law condemnation of eavesdropping into a three-pronged attack on the
problem. The backbone of the Illinois scheme is a broad criminal punishment provision 20 which, subject to narrow exceptions
not pertinent in intrafamily cases, 21 prohibits using eavesdrop-

ping devices 22 in listening to or recording any conversation.

17. The statutory scheme may be found in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 134, §§
15(a), 16 (1959), which provided in pertinent part: "[a]ny person ... who
maliciously and wilfully... taps any telephone line ... belonging to another.., shall be punished... ." It is apparent that tapping one's own
phone line was not legislatively proscribed.
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14-1 et seq. (1977).
19. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14-1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1964 &Supp. 1978);
Michael, Electronic Surveillance In Illinois, 1 Loy. Cm. W. 33, 45 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Electronic Surveillance In Illinois].
20. An Act To Regulate Eavesdropping, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-2
(1977) provides: "A person commits eavesdropping when he: (a) Uses an
eavesdropping device to hear or record all or any part of any conversation
unless he does so (1) with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation or (2) with the consent of any one party ... in accordance with Article
108A of the Code of Criminal Procedure...."
Article 108A dealing with judicial supervision of the use of eavesdropping devices is beyond the scope of this comment, as it is unlikely that such
authorizations would be prevalent in intrafamily situations.
21. The statutory exceptions include: (1) listening to public communications, (2) the overhearing of conversations by employees of communications common carriers in the normal course of their employment, and (3)
listening to or recording emergency communications made by law enforcement, fire-fighting, and medical agencies. See id. § 14-3.
22. An "eavesdropping device" is any device capable of being used to
hear or record conversation whether such conversation is conducted in person, by telephone, or by any other means. Id. § 14-1(a).

Civil Aspects
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Eavesdropping is a felony,23 and those convicted may be punished by up to a $10,000 fine and one to three years imprison24

ment.

The two remedial devices supplementing the criminal penalties are a civil liability section and an exclusionary rule. Each
is conditioned upon a violation of the criminal sanctions of the
eavesdropping article. Upon showing a criminal violation by a
preponderance of the evidence, injured parties are entitled to
25
injunctive relief, as well as actual and punitive damages.
Notwithstanding its availability in a prosecution of an eavesdropper, any evidence obtained in violation of the surveillance
26
ban is inadmissible in any civil or criminal proceeding.
A recent modification strengthened the ban on covert interceptions. The 1961 Act, as originally promulgated, included a
one-party consent exception whereby a person could lawfully
hear or record a conversation between two others as long as one
party had previously acquiesced. 27 Recent amendments require
any one-party consent to be coupled with an eavesdropping order authorized by a State's Attorney and Circuit Judge. The rejection of one-party consent gives practical effect to the claim
that the state unqualifiedly prohibits mechanical eavesdropping
in the private sector. Prior to the 1969 amendment, the recording of a conversation by or with the consent of a party thereto
was lawful despite the other party's lack of knowledge and consent. Today the statute comports with the Committee Comments of 1961 which provide that "since no one seems to favor
eavesdropping by private individuals ... the sole question is as

to whether the police can. '28 While conceivably circumstances
could develop where a consenting spouse, as a criminal complainant, could defend surveillance because of judicial authorization, the one-party consent defense seems to have been
effectively eliminated from intrafamily eavesdropping consideration.
The legislative abrogation of the one-party consent exception indicates this state's contempt for eavesdropping. Despite
the inclusiveness of the statutory scheme, however, developments in this decade have expanded plaintiffs' possibilities for
common law relief and have raised Illinois citizens' freedoms
23. Id. § 14-4.
24. Id. §§ 1005-8-1 & 1005-9-1.
25. Id. § 14-6. (Recovery of damages does not foreclose obtainment of
equitable redress).
26. Id. § 14-5.
27. See In re Estate of Stevenson, 44 Ill.
2d 525, 532, 256 N.E.2d 766, 769
(1970).
28. ILL.ANN.STAT. ch. 38, §§ 14-1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1964 &Supp. 1978).
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from interceptions of communications to constitutional status.
In Leopold v. Levin,29 the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged
the novel existence of a common law cause of action for tortious
invasion of privacy. This tort has yet to be recognized in an intrafamily eavesdropping situtation, though it has been impliedly
30
acknowledged in a non-governmental surveillance scenario.
Illinois public policy, as evidenced by the eavesdropping statutes, indicates that its development probably requires only appellate litigation of such a case.
The 1970 Illinois Constitution elevated prohibitions against
interceptions of communications to a fundamental constitutional principle. Article I, section 6 provides, 'The people shall
have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of privacy or interceptionsof communicationsby eavesdropping devices or other means.13 1 This "secured right"
section appears to be the basis of a constitutional cause of action
for unreasonable interceptions when it is read in conjunction
with Article I, section 12 which commences, "Every person shall
find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs
which he receives to his person, privacy, property, or reputation. '3 2 Far from being merely repetitive of the eavesdropping
statutes, the constitutional mandate extends beyond the scope
of existing legislation. One element of the offense of eavesdropping and, therefore, the statutory civil cause of action, is the use
of an eavesdropping device.3 3 The constitutional prohibition,
however, is intended to reach non-mechanical means of eavesdropping, such as listening with an unaided ear.34
29. 45 Ill. 2d 434, 259 N.E.2d 250 (1970). In Leopold, a right of privacy was
recognized in the context of an appropriation of another's name or likeness
for commercial gain. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 117 (4th ed. 1971). However, the plaintiff, by virtue of his participation in a
highly publicized crime, was held to have remained a public figure in which
no right of privacy existed. 45 Ill.
2d at 442, 259 N.E.2d at 254.
30. See Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Cos., 60 Ill.
App. 3d 831, 377
N.E.2d 126 (1978). See note 159 infra.
31. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1970) (emphasis added).
32. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1970) (emphasis added). See Hanson, Illinois
and the Right of Privacy: History and Current Status, 11 J. MAR.J. 91, 101
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Illinois and the Right of Privacy]. The argument that Article I, section 12 "privacy" refers to non-eavesdropping invasions of privacy can be dispensed with. Rather, the Illinois Supreme Court
has in dictum restricted constitutional privacy protections to interceptions
of communications. See Illinois State Employees Ass'n v. Walker, 57 Ill. 2d
512, 523, 315 N.E.2d 9, 15 (1974).
33. People v. 5948 W. Diversey Ave. Second Floor Apt., Chicago, 95 Mll.
App. 2d 479, 482, 238 N.E.2d 229, 231 (1968).
34. Constitutional Commentary, ILL. ANN. CONST. art. I, § 6 (SmithHurd).
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FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTATION: REPETITION OR KEY TO

SUBSTANTIAL AWARDS?
Federal legislation supplements the comprehensive remedial weaponry of the Illinois statutory, invasion of privacy, and
constitutional, trilogy. In 1934, Congress enacted legislation that
provided that "no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge the existence,
contents, [or] substance... of such intercepted communication
to any person."35 This statute was effectively superseded by
passage of Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968. 36 The dual purpose of this legislation was to
protect the privacy of oral and wire communications and to delineate on a uniform basis the circumstances 37and conditions
under which interceptions could be authorized.
Paralleling its Illinois counterpart, Title III adopted the
38
identical tripartite approach to eavesdropping. Interceptions
and disclosures of wire39 and oral communications 40 are prohibited and punishable by fines of up to $10,000 and not more than
35. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).
36. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (June 19, 1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (1970)) [hereinafter referred to as Title II].
37. S.REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [19681 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2112, 2154 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1097].
The most cited explanations for the enactment of Title III are: (1) the promotion of more effective crime control, United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143,
151 (1974), (2) widespread dissatisfaction with the outdated Federal Communications Act of 1934, because prohibitions against unauthorized use and
publication did not amount to a ban on electronic surveillance per se,
United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 667 n.10 (6th Cir. 1976), (3) bringing
legislation in line with Supreme Court opinions, United States v. United
States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972), and (4) bringing legislation in line
with technological advancements, 11 GA. L. REV. 427, 433 (1977). See also
Greenwault, Wiretapping and Bugging: Striking a Balance Between Privacy and Law Enforcemen4 50 JUDICATURE 303, 304-07 (1967) (discussion of
great availability and minimal cost of eavesdropping devices); Note, The
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy,9 IND. L. REV. 468 (1976).
38. "Intercept" means the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire
or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or
other device. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1970); United States v. New York Tel. Co.,
434 U.S. 159 (1977) ("aural" is the key Title I "interception" element).
39. Wire communications include telephone transmissions. United
States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 1216
(1979). The federal definition requires the wire upon which the communication passes be furnished by one operating facilities for the transmission of
interstate or foreign communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1970); United
States v. Jones, 580 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1978) (affirming award of new trial for
prosecutorial failure to prove tapped telephone had been supplied by one
engaged in interstate or foreign communications commerce).
40. "Oral communications" means that which are uttered by a person
exhibiting an expectation that such communications are not subject to interception, under circumstances justifying such an expectation. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(2) (1970).
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five years imprisonment or both.4 1 Neither the contents of such
intercepted communication nor evidence derived therefrom
may be received in evidence in any federal or state judicial proceeding.4 2 A civil cause of action is created in favor of aggrieved
43
persons, and the awarding of damages is authorized.
Due to Illinois' pervasive eavesdropping ban, many of the

federal civil provisions appear repetitive. The Title I exclusionary rule, while applying to state proceedings, does no more
than the Illinois suppression requirement. Actual and punitive
damages are awardable in both of the statutory causes of ac-

tion." But the federal statutes digress from the Illinois remedial scheme by providing broader civil redress in terms of
attorneys' fees and liquidated damages. Title Im entitles injured
litigants to a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs
reasonably incurred. 45 In Illinois, it is well-established that at-

torneys' fees are not recoverable by prevailing parties unless
the grant is specifically authorized by statute. 46 The Illinois
eavesdropping law does not mention attorneys' fees, and they
are therefore not recoverable against a proven eavesdropper.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (a) (1970) provides, "Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter, any person who wilfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to
intercept, any wire or oral communication; shall be fined... or imprisoned
... or both."
42. Id. § 2515. This ban is not limited to criminal cases or law enforcement contexts. See Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347
(1976).
43. Id. § 2520. Where a defendant discloses that which he unlawfully
intercepts, plaintiffs are not entitled to separate recovery for the interception and disclosure activities. Campiti v. Walonis, 467 F. Supp. 464, 466 (D.
Mass. 1979).
44. Injunctive relief is authorized only by the Illinois eavesdropping
statute. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-6 (1977) with 18 U.S.C. § 2520
(1970).
45. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c) (1970); see Campiti v. Walonis, 467 F. Supp. 464
(D. Mass. 1979) ($5000 attorney's fee where damages limited to $1000); cf.
Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1978) (affirming $12,000 attorney's
fee award which matched actual damage recovery).
46. Stamatiou v. United States Gypsum Co., 400 F. Supp. 431, 440 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), affid, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976); People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166,
177, 374 N.E.2d 194, 199 (1978); Meyer v. Marshall, 62 Ill. 2d 435, 442, 343
N.E.2d 479, 483 (1976); House of Vision, Inc. v. Hiyane, 42 Ill. 2d 45, 51-52, 245
N.E.2d 468, 472 (1969); Byers v. First Nat'l Bank, 85 Ill. 423, 427 (1887).
While the general American rule is that attorneys' fees are not recoverable costs, absent statute or agreement of the parties, narrow judicial exceptions have been carved out in Illinois and other states. None of them are
pertinent to cases of intrafamily mechanical eavesdropping. See generally
Hamer v. Kirk, 64 Ill. 2d 434, 356 N.E.2d 524 (1976) (creation of a common
fund theory); Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1977) (reviews the bases for common fund, substantial benefit, and private
attorney general theories); Sands, Attorneys' Fees As Recoverable Costs, 63
A.B.A.J. 510 (1977); Comment, Constitutionalityof the Illinois Cost Statute,
1976 So. ILL. L.J. 203 (1976).
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Illinois courts have not conclusively determined the meaning of "actual damages" in a surveillance situation. Federal
cases, however, conclude that grave emotional upset is remediable. 4 7 Hence, federal law compensates plaintiffs whose injuries
have not physically manifested themselves. Title III can be the
key to full recovery; especially where, despite lengthy interception periods, actual damages are minimal or unprovable. While
malice must be shown, recovery of punitive damages does not
depend on prior proof of actual damages. 4 8 More important, Title III recovery entails awards of $100 per day of violation of the
interception of communication proscriptions. 49 The purpose of
this liquidated damages provision is to deter and punish violators.5° Yet no plaintiff should fail to recognize that this punishment inheres to his benefit, and requires only civil proof of the
interception and the length of time upon which a substantial 5 1
recovery can be achieved.
Problems of Our Federal System and Conflicts of Law
Recognizing that the infusion of national law carries with it
a variety of concerns in our federal system, inquiry must focus
on problems of federal pre-emption, jurisdiction, and conflicts of
law. While one purpose of Title III was to make federal and
state legislation consistent, the federal law provides minimum
standards, and equally or more stringent state eavesdropping
schemes have not been pre-empted. 52 Illinois' exception-less
47. E.g., Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189, 1193 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(hospital officials intercepted patients' communications with family,
friends, and attorneys).
48. Id. Cf. Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1978) (punitive
damages recovery depends on showing defendants acted wantonly, recklessly, or maliciously); Campiti v. Walonis, 467 F. Supp. 464 (D. Mass. 1979)
(defendants' belief in the propriety of their interceptions rendered an
award of punitive damages inappropriate).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (1970). Cf. Campiti v. Walonis, 467 F. Supp. 464
(D. Mass. 1979) (where a plaintiff seeks civil redress against a number of
defendants who acted in concert, Title III does not allow the daily liquidated damages award to be multiplied by the number of perpetrators).
50. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1978); Marks v.
Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 460 Pa. 73, 76, 331 A.2d 424, 426 (1975).
51. See Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (defendant admitted two and one-half years of covert electronic surveillance).
Civil recovery for unlawful interceptions of communications does not deal
in trivialities. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Ashley, 563 S.W.2d 637
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (jury awarded one million dollars in damages).
52. People v. Conklin, 12 Cal. 3d 259, 269, 522 P.2d 1049, 1055, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 241, 247, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1064 (1974); Commonwealth v. Vitello,
367 Mass. 224, 246, 327 N.E.2d 819, 833 (1975). When a state imposes more
rigid requirements than Title HII, those will control in all cases except in
federal investigations conducted exclusively by federal officers. S. REP. No.
1097, supra note 37, at 2181, 2189. Accord, People v. Fidler, 72 fI. App. 3d 924,
391 N.E.2d 210 (1979) (evidence admissible in state court if obtained in vio-

546

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:537

sanctions are claimed to provide stricter prohibitions against
eavesdropping than are found in Title HI,53 and have been re-

peatedly upheld against pre-emption, as well as constitutional
challenges. 54
Title III expressly applies to state court proceedings and its
supplementary remedies are therefore requestable in a civil suit
in Illinois courts. Therefore, plaintiffs may plead both state and
federal causes of action in state court. Filing suit in federal
court is a viable alternative, however, at least in Illinois. Some
federal courts have been unwilling to recognize pendent jurisdiction over state eavesdropping causes of action, even where a
valid Title III claim has been stated.5 5 In Bianco v. American
Broadcasting Companies,56 however, a federal district court in
Illinois agreed to consider a civil cause of action under the Illistatutes, after first having dispensed with
nois eavesdropping
57
the Title III claim.
After suit is filed, aspects of conflicts of law might extend
inquiry beyond the Illinois and Title III eavesdropping bans.
Conflicts problems could permeate intrafamily interception disputes if, for example, estranged spouses or separated family
members converse on the telephone from points in different jurisdictions. The recognized rule in such situations is that the
law of the locality where the tap exists, and therefore where the
interception takes place, governs its validity.5 8 This is so even if
lation of Illinois eavesdropping law by federal officers acting pursuant to

Title III).

53. See Electronic Surveillance In Illinois, supranote 19, at 45.
54. See, e.g., People v. Giannopoulos, 20 Ill. App. 3d 338, 314 N.E.2d 237
(1974).
55. See, e.g, Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
56. 470 F. Supp. 182 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
57. See id. at 185. In Bianco, defendants' alleged eavesdropping was
pleaded as the basis for plaintiffs' state and federal counts. The court determined that under United Mine Workers of Amercia v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966), it had power to adjudicate the state law claim. The court concluded
that this was an appropriate situation for the discretionary exercise of pendent jurisdiction. The policy favoring conservation of judicial energy and
avoidance of multiplicity of litigation usurped defendants' contentions that
the state issues predominated and that a joint trial would confuse the fact

finder. 470 F. Supp. at 185.
The court also dispelled defendants' argument that this was a proper
case for federal abstention. A federal court can refrain from considering a
meritorious claim where a state statute is susceptible of state judicial interpretation which might avoid the necessity of federal constitutional adjudication. E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976). A similar problem arises
when a federal court is confronted with a state statute interpreted only by a
state trial court in an unreported, unappealed opinion. See Yesterday's
Children v. Kennedy, 569 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1978). In Bianco, there was no
constitutional question to avoid, and Illinois appellate courts had construed

the state's eavesdropping law on the point to be tried. 470 F. Supp. at 186.
58. Stowe v. Devoy, 588 F.2d 336, 341 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978).
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the conversation transgressed jurisdictional boundaries, and the
injury to the aggrieved party occurred elsewhere. Illinois telephone users who are eavesdropped upon by someone in a sister
state must proceed under that state's law. A number of jurisdictions have patterned their legislation after Title JH.5 9 But not all
states couple civil remedies with criminal punishment. 60 Thus,
some plaintiffs may be left to the remedies of Title I and the
deliberately developing common law tort of invasion of privacy.
TITLE

m

CiviL RECOVERY FOR INTRAFAMILY INTERCEPTIONS OF
COMMUNICATIONS

While Title III's attorney's fee and liquidated damages provisions serve to deter eavesdroppers and adequately compensate victims, various pitfalls stand between surveillance
discovery and recovery. Not all defenses to a Title II civil claim
emanate solely from the infusion of domestic conflicts into a
statutory scheme primarily concerned with law enforcement.
Tortured interpretations of clear statutory language and a judicially carved intrafamily surveillance exception to federal jurisdiction do, however, originate in applications of Title HI to
domestic eavesdropping.
59. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631 et seq. (West 1970 &1978 Supp.); COLO. REV.
§§ 18-9-301 etseq. (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.01 etseq. (West 1976);

STAT.

KAN. STAT. §§ 21-4001, 22-2514 et seq. (1974); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. §§ 10-401 et seq. (Cumin. Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272,
§§ 99 et seq. (West 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 86-701 et seq. (1976); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 200.610 et seq. (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 570-A: 1 et seq. (Supp.
1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 156A-1 et seq. (West 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, §§ 5701 et seq. (Purdon 1977); R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 12-5.1-1 et seq. (Supp.
1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-13A-2 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9401 et seq. (1978); VA. CODE §§ 19.2-61 et seq. (1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.73.030 et seq. (1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.31 (West 1978).
60. Among jurisdictions with eavesdropping statutes, the following do
not statutorily provide a civil cause of action to the aggrieved person: ALA.
CODE § 37-8-210 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 11.60.280 (1978); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3004 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53A-187 (West 1977); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1336 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-3001 etseq. (1976); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 711-1110 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 727.8 (Supp. 1978); Ky. REV.
STAT. § 433.330 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:332 (West 1978); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. § 750.539 (Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-8-114(1) (c)

(1977); N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 40A-12: 1 (Supp. 1978); N.Y.

PENAL LAW

§§ 250.00 et

seq. (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-227.1 et seq. (Supp. 1977); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-02 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2933.58 & 4931.28
(1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1757 (Supp. 1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540
(1975); S.C. CODE § 16-17-470 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4533 (Supp. 1978);
TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1979).
Other jurisdictions have not enacted surveillance statutes, and rely totally on Title III. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Lopp, 378 N.E.2d 414, 416 (Ind.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1023 (1979). See note 14 supra.
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The leading case scrutinizing Title III in an interspousal
civil suit for damages was Simpson v. Simpson,6 1 which denied
a post-divorce cause of action to a woman whose husband had
covertly attached a recording device to the marital home telephone. The Fifth Circuit initially noted that "[t]he naked language of Title III, by virtue of its inclusiveness, reaches this
'
case, "62
but qualified this by holding that "Congress did not intend such a far reaching result, one extending into areas normally left to the states, those of the marital home and domestic
conflicts. ' 63 To buttress their conclusion, the court embarked
upon an exhaustive and admittedly inconclusive search of the
legislative history of Title III. It found no direct indication that

Congress intended to create an interspousal eavesdropping
cause of action, and discovered only scattered suggestions that
it was aware that the statute's inclusiveness could reach such a

case.64 This statutory interpretation was also supported by
warning that criminal punishment would be possible. Noting
that criminal statutes must be construed to avoid ensnaring behavior not clearly proscribed, the court utilized its aforementioned statutory conclusion to state that interspousal
eavesdropping was not clearly proscribed, and was therefore
neither criminally punishable nor civilly remediable. 65 The
Simpson opinion was carefully limited, however, to interceptions between cohabiting spouses perfected within the marital
home. 66
61. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974). In Simpson,
the defendant obtained a device for recording telephone conversations from
the family phone. While the parties had been divorced prior to the filing of
the eavesdropping suit, plaintiff's communications with men other than the
defendant, had been intercepted while the parties had been married and
living together. The defendant played the tape recordings for various neighbors and friends, and for an attorney, on whose advice plaintiff agreed to an
uncontested divorce. Id. at 804.
62. Id. at 805.
63. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970) commences "[a]ny person whose wire or
oral communication is intercepted ... shall (1) have a civil cause of action
against any person who intercepts ... such communication and (2) be entitled to recover from any such person.... ." (emphasis added).
64. 490 F.2d at 806. Four reasons were given to support this conclusion:
(1) the major purpose of Title I had been to combat crime, especially organized crime, S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 37, at 2157, (2) the real concern of
Title M was strengthening the position of law enforcement officers, id. at
2112, (3) the equivalent of only one page of legislative commentary concerned private interceptions, 490 F.2d at 806-07, and (4) there were statements made before Congressional hearings that there was no intention of
making it a crime for a father to listen in on his teenage daughter's telephone conversations. Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Jud. Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 901 (1967).
65. Id. at 809.
66. Id. at 810.
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Acknowledging Simpson's distinction between interspousal
taps in the marital home and third party intrusions therein, a
Third Circuit district court in Remington v. Remington,67 agreed
that Congress did not intend to provide a federal remedy for
purely domestic interceptions, but allowed a man's suit against
his former wife who, during their marriage, had acted in concert
with others in tapping the marital home telephone.6 8 This
anomalous distinction, based upon the presence or absence of
third party assistance, has been criticized. 69 The most obvious
criticism of this line of demarcation has never been mentioned;
namely, the unfairness of providing a defense to one who is
skilled in electronics, while punishing one who must seek third
party aid in accomplishing an equivalent interception.
The Sixth Circuit refused to be bound by these precedents.
and third party distinctions. In United States v. Jones,70 the dismissal of an interspousal eavesdropper's indictment was reversed despite the absence of third party wiretapping
assistance. Simpson was distinguished because the interception had not taken place in the marital home between cohabiting
spouses. 7 1 The Jones defendant had been living apart from his
wife, and perfected the interception on the telephone in her
abode. The Jones opinion was not content with distinguishing
Simpson, however, and employed the identical legislative matter in concluding that Congress had not intended an interspousal exception to Title 111.72 This elucidation brought the
circuits into conflict on the existence of an implied interspousal
67. 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In Remington, the defendant was
assisted in her eavesdropping by private detectives and attorneys, who
were also made parties to the suit. Where a plaintiff recovers against multiple eavesdropping defendants, the liability is not individual, but joint and
several. E.g., Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of third party's attempts to create an implied derivative spousal immunity to Title I, see text accompanying notes 105-115 infra.
68. 393 F. Supp. at 901.
69. One anomaly noted is that while if a spouse had third party aid in
the surveillance, he can be sued, a spouse who intercepts a telephone communication on his own and then discloses the preserved information to various persons, has a valid defense for his actions. See Interspousal
SurveillanceImmunity, supra note 7, at 208. Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1970) (disclosures and other uses of intercepted communications are as civilly remediable as the interceptions themselves).
Another argument that has been raised is that when the courts focus on
third party assistance to the defendant, they lack a proper perspective and
should concern themselves more with the invasions of privacy of parties to
the conversations with the spouse who is eavesdropped upon. Interspousal
Surveillance Immunity, supra note 7, at 201, 209.
70. 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
71. Id. at 672.
72. Id. at 667-68. Alternative premises were used in Jones. First, the
court espoused the well-established principle of construction that legislative histories should not be referred to when a statute is clear on its face.
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Title III immunity. The task of exploring the weaknesses of the
decisions and their supporting rationale was left to the commentators.
Despite arguments that Simpson was wrongly decided,
would and should never be followed, and that Jones rendered its
statutory interpretation valueless, 7 3 the Fifth Circuit opinion remains a precedential bar to civil recovery under Title III. 7 4 Furthermore, notwithstanding its denouncement of Simpson, the
Jones opinion ended apologetically with, "[wle reach this conclusion reluctantly because we share the concern of other courts
which have grappled with this problem, that application of federal law to essentially domestic conflicts may lead to harsh results. ' 75 Hence, what was considered a matter of statutory
The court believed the "any person" language of section 2520 was as unambiguous as any that could have been chosen. Id.
Secondly, the Jones opinion disputed Simpson's legislative history conclusion, finding a number of Congressional references to private interceptions, some dealing with domestic relations. E.g., (1) "[T]itle III prohibits
all wiretapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly authorized law enforcement officers." S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 37, at 2153.
(2) "A broad prohibition is imposed on private use of electronic surveillance, particularly in domestic relations and industrial espionage situations." Id. at 2272 (emphasis added).
Congress passed Title II pursuant to its commerce powers to reach industrial espionage cases. There is no interstate character in many domestic
relations interceptions, hence Congress' alternative basis, section five of the
fourteenth amendment, shows that a principal area of the legislators' concern was the use of surveillance for marital litigation. 542 F.2d at 669. The
Sixth Circuit also rejected the frivolous contention that the single page of
references to private interceptions somehow justified judicial creation of an
interspousal Title III immunity. It believed that the ban on all forms of private surveillance was so universally recognized that Congress concentrated
on law enforcement problems. Id.
73. See THE LAw OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, supra note 1, at 100 (author rejects Simpson as wrongly decided); InterspousalSurveillance Immunity, supra note 7, at 201 (author quoted from private correspondence with
G. Robert Blakely, the primary author of Title Ill, "[t] he Fifth Circuit decision Simpson is the one that was incorrectly decided. Title III was intended
to mean what it says-no surveillance by third parties without a warrantby police, spouses... or [in] any other relevant relation."); 11 GA. L. REV.
427, 434 (1977) (Simpson should not be followed); 11 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1367,
1373 (1977) (Jones renders Simpson's interspousal immunity construction
without merit).
74. See United States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 1216 (1979) (refusing to decide between the Fifth and Sixth
Circuit approaches, deciding the case on other grounds). In its only chance
to overrule Simpson, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Schrimsher, 493
F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1975), distinguished the fact that the parties in the latter
case were not legally married, and that there was no "marital home" eavesdropping locus in quo. Id. at 851. But see Kratz v. Kratz, 48 U.S.L.W. 2173
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 1979) (Simpson expressly rejected in holding that wife
whose private telephone conversations were intercepted and recorded by
her husband had Title III civil cause of action for damages).
75. 542 F.2d at 673 (emphasis added). For the results of Jones on remand, see note 39 supra.
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interpretation in Simpson was transformed by Jones' dictum
into a problem of judicial restraint and "eavesdropping federalism."
Judicial Restraint: Intrafamily EavesdroppingFederalism
In Anonymous v. Anonymous, 76 the intrafamily interception
issue was framed in terms of the point at which wiretapping
leaves the province of mere marital disputes, a matter left to the
states, and rises to the level of criminal conduct justifying application of federal law. 77 This federalism test was applied to a situation where a post-divorce Title III civil suit was commenced
by a woman against her former husband, who, while in temporary custody of the parties' children, electronically eavesdropped upon her conversations with them. The abandonment
of Simpson's statutory interpretation test is evidenced by the
court's holding. While the court suggested that under certain
circumstances a plaintiff could recover from a spouse under Title III, the present plaintiff was denied federal relief because the
78
facts presented a purely domestic child custody conflict.
This "eavesdropping federalism" concept arises from the
historical reluctance of federal courts to entertain suits involving divorce and child custody disputes. 79 With so deep-rooted a
basis, judicial restraint from hearing a domestic interception
76. 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977), affg London v. London, 420 F. Supp. 944
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). In London, pursuant to a separation agreement, the defendant-husband retained temporary custody. He attached a device which
enabled him to listen to conversations made on the living room telephone,
without either lifting an extension phone receiver or being present in the
room. The defendant also instructed his children, ages five and seven, to
push a record button whenever they spoke with their mother. This action
preserved messages received while the father was not at home.
The district court opinion spoke in statutory interpretation terms, and
expanded the Simpson "interspousal eavesdropping in the marital home"
exception to encompass intrafamily interceptions within the locus in quo of
a family home. What was important was that the eavesdropping situs was
in a family home, shared by a parent and another family member, whose
conversations were recorded. In this discussion, the plaintiff-mother was
relegated to the status of the third party to the conversation, with the central focus being placed on the father's interceptions of the children's
messages. 420 F. Supp. at 945-46.
77. 558 F.2d at 677.
78. Id. at 679. Cf. Nouse v. Nouse, 450 F. Supp. 97 (D. Md. 1978) (incarcerated father's suit against ex-wife for interceptions of his letters to parties' children dismissed pursuant to domestic relations exception to federal
court jurisdiction because it concerned custody and parental communication rights).

79. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890); Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018 (3d Cir. 1975).
This implict exception to federal court jurisdiction is thought to date to the
oft-quoted dictum in Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (disclaiming any federal court jurisdiction on the subjects of divorce and alimony).
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case is much easier to support than the affirmative creation of
an intrafamily immunity by judicial flat. This is especially true
where, as in Simpson, the immunity develops under the guise of
interpretation of a statute whose unambiguous language makes
80
such a construction ludicrous.
The relegation of a Title III plaintiff from federal to state remedial devices is a definite bar to intrafamily eavesdropping
suits where a court concludes that the heart of the matter is a
marital or other domestic dispute. Anonymous' holding spoke
of federal law as well as federal court, and could be extended to
bar utilization of Title III in state court. Pleading a federal cause
of action in state court may not be within the purview of the
Anonymous rationale, however, if this caveat is merely jurisdictional. Nevertheless, other exceptions, expressly delineated by
Congress, permeate the legislation. Some were used to justify
the aforementioned statutory interpretation and federalismbased denials of recovery. In state or federal court, these exceptions appear employable as obstacles to Title I relief.
Employability of the Title III Consent Exception
Contrary to Illinois law,8 1 and absent an injurious purpose,
Title III neither punishes nor remedies interceptions made by or
with the consent of a party to the conversation. 82 This rule has
been justified in law enforcement cases on the ground that there
is no constitutionally protected expectation that a party to
whom a communication is made won't consent to its being overhead or recorded. 83 The consent exception is not limited to police surveillance, however, as the legislative history of Title Ill
provides that "the use of surveillance techniques by private un80. See note 63 supra (any person has a civil cause of action against any
person). Cf. note 41 supra (all wilful interceptions are punishable except
those specifically exempted). Various courts have rejected the premise
that they can imply Title I exceptions that Congress did not explicitly
enunciate. See, e.g., Campiti v. Walonis, 453 F. Supp. 819 (D. Mass. 1978)
(prison inmates communications intercepted); Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976) (admissibility of wiretapping evidence in divorce proceeding). Cf. Connin v. Connin, 89 Misc. 2d 548, 392
N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (court would not imply exception to state statute covering suppression of eavesdropping evidence).
81. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
82. United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 474 (7th Cir. 1977). 18 U.S.C.
§ 2511(2) (d) (1970) provides, "It shall not be unlawful ... to intercept a...
communication where such person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent...
unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing
any criminal or tortious act ...

or ...

any other injurious act." This con-

sent exception is not unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Edelson,
581 F.2d 1290, 1292 (7th Cir. 1978).
83. E.g., United States v. Rathbun, 355 U.S. 107, 111 (1957).
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authorized hands has little justification where communications
8' 4
are intercepted without the consent of one of the participants.
85
Nevertheless, two requisites must be met by the Title III civil
defendant: the consent and the absence of a criminal, tortious,
or injurious purpose.
The issue of whether there has been a consent depends on
"capacity" to do so in a number of particulars. In Anonymous,
the court refused to deal with the father's contentions that his
seven year old child had consented to the interceptions of his
estranged wife's messages, or, that if the child lacked capacity,
he as lawful guardian impliedly consented for her. In Berk v.
Berk,86 the court was confronted with similar facts and the argument that the "consenting" seven year old was sui juris. It
hinted that children of that age were incapable of giving effective consent.8 7 Illinois' more lenient view of one-party consent,
prior to its legislative modification, is evidenced by a case which
adjudicated a woman incompetent, but held that she had been
88
capable of acquiescing in the recording of her conversations.
The present Illinois statute requires two-party consent or oneparty consent coupled with judicial authorization.8 9 This rationale would be important, however, in adjudicating the consent issue in Title III suits in Illinois courts. If an incompetent can
consent to interceptions, then assent by a minor child, with minimal parental persuasion, could legitimate eavesdropping between estranged or former spouses.
The problem of implied intrafamily consent, though ignored
in Anonymous, was discussed in Simpson, and epitomizes the
judicial struggle for standards in determining whether individual privacy rights are qualified by virtue of familial ties. While
Simpson refused to grant the requested relief, the court was adamant in concluding that any effective consent must be by a
party actually participating in the conversation. 90 This excludes
any "consent" of an interceptor for his spouse. The contention
that the wife's use of the marital home telephone amounted to
her implied consent to her husband's eavesdropping was also
84. S. REP. No. 1097, supra note 37, at 2156.
85. Consent is an affirmative defense on which the defendant has the

burden of proof in a civil action under Title

m.

Campiti v. Walonis, 453 F.

Supp. 819, 823 (D. Mass. 1978); accord,United States v. McCann, 465 F.2d 147
(5th Cir. 1972).
86. 95 Misc. 2d 33, 406 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Fam. Ct. 1978). See note 185 and
accompanying text infra.
87. Id. at 34, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
88. In re Estate of Stevenson, 44 Ill. 2d 525,532, 256 N.E.2d 766, 770 (1970).
89. See id.
90. 490 F.2d at 805 n.3.
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rejected.9 1 From the foregoing it appears that while an express
consent by a participant is rare, it is required. This exception
therefore would be most useful in cases dealing with the Anonymous child consent situation, or where, for example, a spouse is
able to implore a friend to agree both to converse with the other
spouse and to the recording of the conversation.
The requisite "absence of an illegal, tortious, or injurious
purpose" language has met with conflicting interpretations. The
Simpson court believed this proviso was intended to reach consensual recordings made for the purpose of blackmailing, threat92
ening, or publicly embarrassing the non-consenting party.
Blackmail or a lesser threat was Mr. Simpson's apparent motive,
as he used the tape recordings to procure an uncontested divorce. However, the Simpson rationale does not encompass situations where one's purpose is noble or merely the satisfaction
of curiosity. All interceptions are in effect made for the illegal
purpose of violating two-party consent state eavesdropping
laws. Adoption of this interpretation would render the federal
consent exception valueless, and it has been judicially rejected
93
by an Illinois federal district court.
Various courts have dealt with the claim that a tortious purpose exists where an interceptor tortiously invades the privacy
of the non-consenting participant. Invasion of privacy as a tort,
if employed as the "tortious purpose," would render the consent
exception meaningless since all one-party consent interceptions
necessarily involve invasions of the other person's privacy. The
Seventh Circuit has taken cognizance of this anomaly, and concluded that a consent is saved if there is a valid underlying purpose other than the invasion of privacy.9 Satisfaction of one's
curiosity as to spousal fidelity or detrimental conversations between a non-custodial parent and the interceptor's child may be
such a valid underlying purpose. In addition to barring an intrafamily Title III action for damages, the consent exception's
importance also stems from its judicial application to another
statutory caveat: the extension telephone exemption.
The Augmentation of the Extension Telephone Exception
The Title III extension telephone exception originates in
91. Id. at 805. But cf. Commonwealth v. Goldberg, 208 Pa. Super. Ct. 513,
224 A.2d 91 (1966) (implied condition that subscriber to phone line could
intercept communications thereon).
.92. 490 F.2d at 805 n.5; accord, Moore v. Telfon Communications Corp.,
589 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1978); Meredith v. Gavin, 446 F.2d 794 (8th Cir. 1971).
93. Stamatiou v. United States Gypsum Co., 400 F. Supp. 431, 436 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), affd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976).
94. United States v. Edelson, 581 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1978).
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that instrument's exclusion from the definition of "electronic,
mechanical, or other device," the use of which is a prerequisite
95
for the "interception" on which a Title III violation depends.
One issue which has left the courts divided is whether a oneparty consent requirement is implicit in the Congressionally
created extension phone rationale. A line of cases headed by
United States v. Harpe196 has concluded that the "ordinary
course" language of the extension exemption contemplates that
authorization for listening in must be obtained before eaves9
dropping is excluded from the scope of Title ]I. 7
Other viewpoints have found judicial support. In Simpson,
the Fifth Circuit scrutinized the legislative history of this Title
III exception. That court took a narrower approach to the "ordinary course" modifier, and believed it connoted no more than
use by the phone line's subscriber rather than intruders to the
subscriber's abode.98 The Second Circuit's elucidation goes further. In Anonymous, Harpel was flatly rejected on the ground
that its interpretation rendered the extension telephone exception meaningless, since interceptions which were acquiesced in
99
This clarifiwere already exempted by the "consent" section.
cation merely supported the court's federalism holding. In an
industrial espionage situation, however, Anonymous' reasoning
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5) (1970) provides "'electronic, mechanical, or other
device' means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept.., a
communication other than (a) any telephone... (i) ... being used by the
subscriber in the ordinary course of its business. .. ." The "ordinary
course of its business" modifier was inserted to reduce fears that the police
and others could enter and use someone's phone extension without penalty. Its inclusion substituted for the partially recommended deletion of the
extension phone section. See generally Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d
677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977).
96. 493 F.2d 346 (10th Cir. 1974).
97. Id. at 351. Accord, Gerrard v. Blackman, 401 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ill.
1975) (use of extension to overhear patients' conversations was not in ordinary course of hospital's business); Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C.
373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976) (extension located in husband's office used not for
company business, but solely to record calls made to family home). Cf.
James v. Newspaper Agency Co., 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979) (lower court
finding of lawful business purpose in recording telephone calls and decision
denying Title III civil relief were held to be consistent with Harpel'sreason-

ing).
98. 490 F.2d at 809 n.17. The Simpson court had supported its statutory
interpretation with this construction of the extension phone exception. It
believed that this section was indicative of Congressional intent to abjure
from deciding the intimate question of intrafamily privacy. Id. This contention is rebuttable, however, as business offices have extensions, and no one
has ever claimed that industrial espionage is outside the purview of Title
I[I.
99. 558 F.2d at 679 n.5. Great emphasis was placed on testimony before
Congress stating, "I take it nobody wants to make it a crime for a father to
listen in on his teenage daughter or some such related problem." Hearings
on the Anti-Crime Program Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Jud.
Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 901 (1967).
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was adopted in holding that "ordinary course" does not necessitate a finding of consent. 10 0 Since it must be presumed that
Congress did not intend a construction which would render the
extension phone caveat meaningless, Title III apparently does
not provide a civil remedy to one whose conversations were
overheard by a family member's use of an extension telephone.
Judicial augmentation of this sub-section, however, has extended its scope well beyond what could ever have been contemplated by Congress. The Harpel court had occasion to
determine the point at which the Title III "interception" takes
place when a recording device is attached to a telephone receiver. It believed the telephone receiver was the real acquiring
mechanism, and that the recorder was a mere accessory. Holding that only the acquisition means are crucial, the recording
was determined to have been immaterial where the consented
to overhearing was lawful. 10
The Simpson and Anonymous opinions used similar reasoning in expanding the extension phone exemption from mere "listening in" to encompass the utilization of recording devices in
conjunction with the phone. 0 2u This rationale may be justifiable
if the interceptor records conversations while he is listening.
That was not the case in those two fact situations, however,
since the devices employed enabled the eavesdroppers to record
phone conversations regardless of their absence. While these
decisions have been severely criticized,10 3 and are probably not
within the contemplation of Congress, 104 they have not been
overruled or qualified. Taken to a logical extreme, Title III recovery could be barred where any type of eavesdropping device
is placed on an extension telephone. More important, should a
100. Briggs v. American Air Filter Co., 455 F. Supp. 179, 181 (N.D. Ga.
1978).
101. United States v. Harpel, 493 F.2d at 350. But cf. United States v.
Turk, 526 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1976) (recording, rather than overhearing, was at
center of Congress' concern).
102. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977) (fact that

defendant taped conversations that he permissibly overheard was a distinction without a difference); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir.
1974) (failed to appreciate the difference between mere overhearing and the
attachment of a recording device to a telephone).
103. See InterspousalSurveillance Immunity, supra note 7, at 205 (exten-

sion phone overhearing requires eavesdropper's presence and involves
problems of human hunger and sleep, while wiretap needs minimal supervision; wiretap, because it is not selective in what it intercepts, has greater
potential for violating privacy rights of third persons unrelated to the domestic squabble).
104. Title I was intended to protect individuals against invasions of privacy by sophisticated surveillance devices. S. REP. No. 1097, upra note 37,
at 2153. While the utilization of an extension phone can hardly be termed
sophisticated surveillance, the covert attachment thereto of a recording device requires at least some degree of mechanical skill.
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court adopt such a position, it would probably apply in suits by
family members versus third party private investigators who assist in installing devices and in monitoring conversations. Contempt for third party intrusions, especially by private detectives,
has prevented such a result from arising so far.
Implied Derivative Spousal Immunity
Requests for judicial creation of a derivative immunity for
private investigators who provide assistance to eavesdropping
spouses have been twice refused. In White v. Weiss, 10 5 a civil
cause of action was brought by a man against a private detective
who'd been employed by the plaintiff's ex-wife. The defendant
had furnished eavesdropping equipment and assisted in its installation. As in Simpson the locus in quo of the interception
was the home where the married couple had cohabited. The
court ruled, however, that neither the language or legislative
history of Title I nor Simpson insulated a private investigator
from civil liability for personally instructing and supervising an
individual in the installation of telephone wiretapping equip10 6
ment.
This result does not appear anomalous until the defendant's
conduct is scrutinized against the Title III civil remedy section's
grant of a cause of action against one who intercepts, discloses,
or uses communications or procures another to do so. Weiss did
not intercept any communications, he only assisted in setting up
the surveillance equipment. 107 The "aural acquisition" needed
for an "interception" means to come into possession through the
sense of hearing. 1° 8 No court has ever held that installation of a
device, without more, constitutes an "aural acquisition." The
defendant never disclosed or otherwise used the communications. Therefore, the private detective who was actually "procured" by the woman was held to have procured the woman for
interception of her husband's conversations. 109 Thus the term
"procure," which appears to have been included to deter a prin105. 535 F.2d 1067 (8th Cir. 1976).
106. Id. at 1069. But cf. Bodrey v. Cape, 120 Ga. App. 859, 172 S.E.2d 643
(1969) (third parties who assisted man in eavesdropping upon his ex-wife
shared in man's defense of woman's implied waiver of right of privacy).
107. 535 F.2d at 1071.
108. Smith v. Wunker, 356 F. Supp. 44, 46 (S.D. Ohio 1972). Cf. United
States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658-59 (5th Cir. 1976) (acquisition can be by a
recording device as an agent of the ear).
109. 535 F.2d at 1070. The Weiss court emphasized that mere suppliers of
wiretapping equipment are to be treated differently than those who, like
Weiss, supervise its installation. Id. at 1072 n.5. See also White v. Longo,
190 Neb. 703, 212 N.W.2d 84 (1973) (reversing criminal conversation award
for erroneous admission of tapes made during the eavesdropping involved
in Weiss).
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cipal from procuring an eavesdropping agent, is also employable
to punish the agent whose only activity was the preparation for
his principal's eavesdropping.
In its only opportunity to construe Title III in an intrafamily
eavesdropping case, the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Rizzo, 1 10 without citation to Weiss, affirmed a private investigator's criminal conviction and rejected the contended existence
of an "implied derivative spousal immunity" to Title In. 1 ' The
court was confronted with the constructions given Title III in
Simpson and Jones, but refused to choose between the two interpretations. Instead the case was decided by merely distinguishing Simpson as limited to interspousal, and thus
112
differentiable from private investigatory, eavesdropping.
The significance of Rizzo stems less from what the court did,
than what it failed to do. In not performing its own search of the
legislative history of Title flI, or otherwise adopting the Jones
approach, the Rizzo court refused to foreclose the possibility of
employing Simpson as a bar to civil recovery for purely interspousal eavesdropping. Rizzo was decided by rejecting a derivative spousal immunity on statutory interpretation grounds. The
court, therefore, left open the possibility that private detectives
and other third parties could base defenses on the "consent"
and "extension telephone" exemptions, and more importantly
the Simpson-Anonymous augmentation of the latter. So while
both suits involving private detectives in marital disputes have
punished their interceptions, persuasive arguments remain employable by future third party eavesdropping defendants.
While Weiss and Rizzo dealt with non-family members as
defendants in domestic eavesdropping situations, the importance of such persons as plaintiffs can not be minimized. Indeed, the bulk of critical commentary on Simpson has centered
on the lack of consideration afforded the privacy rights of the
other party to the conversation. Consequently, authors have
construed Simpson as a bar to interspousal suits as distinct
from a prohibition on all recovery by all parties where interspousal eavesdropping is alleged. 1 3 Nevertheless, the district
110. 583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1216 (1979). In
Rizzo, the defendant was charged in a multiple count Title III indictment.
The evidence at trial disclosed that the defendant had on a number of occasions either installed eavesdropping equipment or procured suspicious
spouses to connect devices to family telephones. Id. at 908. On appeal, the
detective contended that Title III did not apply to interceptions by spouses
within the marital home, and that he shared the immunity of eavesdropping
spouses who needed assistance to effectuate interceptions that skilled persons could have accomplished themselves. Id.

111. Id. at 910.
112. Id. at 909.
113. See, e.g., Interspousal Surveillance Immunity, supra note 7, at 211
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court in London v. London 1 4 explained that "[hIaving read the
statute as not extending to the interception of calls by family
members within the family home, it would be anomalous to conclude that although section 2520 confers no cause of action in
favor of the family member, it does confer a claim on the other
party to the call." 115 So despite concern for the privacy interests
of other parties to intercepted communications, precedent can
be found which supports this second branch of derivative
spousal immunity-a bar to third party suits against interceptors, where the aggrieved family member could not recover on his own.
To summarize Title III judicial holdings, the privacy interests of family members and those who converse with them seem
to depend on the presence or absence of third party eavesdroppers. Family members and other parties to their conversations
are allowed recovery against third parties, but are precluded by
statutory interpretation and discretionary federalism notions
from federal relief against family members in purely domestic
disputes. In contrast to these federal limitations is Illinois' "unqualified" eavesdropping proscription. The relative ease with
which Title III claims can be defended makes it likely that Illinois plaintiffs would rely heavily on state remedies.
CAVEATS TO THE ILLINOIS REMEDIAL TRILOGY

Should a plaintiff be left to Illinois remedies, the inability to
claim an attorney's fee and liquidated damages is compensated
for by Illinois' "express exception-less" ban on private eaves-

dropping. This statute is supplemented by possible tortious invasion of privacy and constitutional causes of action. This

remedial trilogy appears impenetrable on its face. However, judicial interpretations and the Proceedings of the 1970 Illinois

Constitutional Convention create arguments that could render a
plaintiff family member completely remediless.

The EavesdroppingStatutes
The Illinois eavesdropping statutes contain no express
"family interception" exception, and none can be implied from
the language or the committee comments. In three instances,
however, court ascertainment of legislative intent has narrowed
the scope of this "absolute" eavesdropping ban.
(author has no doubt that innocent parties to intercepted conversations can
avail themselves of Title M remedies versus eavesdropping spouses).
114. 420 F. Supp. 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affid sub nom. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977). See note 76 supra.
115. Id. at 947.

560

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 12:537

"Unaided Ear"and "Intent to Keep Private" Restrictions

Unlike Title III, Illinois does not completely exempt exterision telephones from the definition of "eavesdropping devices,"
and all improper telephone usage seems to fall under the bar of
the state statutes.1 1 6 A number of Illinois appellate opinions
have concluded, however, that listening to the telephone on
which a conversation is being conducted constitutes only the
use of an "unaided ear" rather than an eavesdropping device on
which the statutory sanctions depend. 117 This exception does
not contemplate a person's overhearing via an extension phone.
But included within its realm are situations where either the alleged eavesdropper places his ear to the receiver on which a
party is receiving a communication or an assistant holds out the
receiver in such a manner as to project the amplified communications to one within listening distance. While the use of surveillance equipment precludes defending with the "unaided
ear" rationale, other judicially discovered exceptions apply even
when eavesdropping devices are employed.
In People v. Klingenberg,118 the court substituted its view of
the Illinois statutes for that of the legislature, and in concluding
the General Assembly had not intended an over-inclusive ban,
restricted the scope of illegal eavesdropping to the listening or
recording of statements intended to be of a private nature. 1 9
Klingenberg did not deal with a telephone "wire communication," but rather with "oral communications" which were intercepted with a "room bug" rather than a telephone tap. The
importance of this judicial creation is that the Illinois scheme is
equated with Title HII, which expressly defines an interceptable
"oral communication" in terms of an expectation of privacy.120
Under Title III, and now Klingenberg, one whose oral communications are overheard must prove not only the wilful intercep116. Electronic Surveillance In Illinois,supra note 19, at 45. This all-in-

clusive ban has been judicially criticized as contrary to common sense. See
People v. Kurth, 34 Ill. 2d 387, 397, 216 N.E.2d 154, 162 (1966) (Schaefer, J.,
concurring) (realizing that a businessman who records an order over the
phone to insure accuracy is technically guilty of eavesdropping despite absence of injurious motive).
117. People v. Szymanski, 22 Ill. App. 3d 720, 318 N.E.2d 80 (1974); People
v. Giannopoulos, 20 IMI.
App. 3d 338, 314 N.E.2d 237 (1974); People v. Brown,
131 Ill. App. 2d 244, 266 N.E.2d 131 (1970); People v. 5948 W. Diversey Ave.
Second Floor Apt., Chicago, 95 M11.
App. 2d 479, 238 N.E.2d 229 (1968). An
"unaided ear" exception is also implicit in Title HI. United States v. McLeoad, 493 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 1974).
118. 34 Ill. App. 3d 705, 339 N.E.2d 456 (1975).
119. Id. at 708, 339 N.E.2d at 459. The audio-visual recording of a defendant's movements while in police custody for drunken driving was found to
be outside the scope of the eavesdropping ban, because the defendant did
not intend to keep his statements private.
120. See note 40 supra.
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tion, but also that the communication was uttered while
exhibiting an expectation that such communication was to be
121

private, under circumstancesjustifying such an expectation.

This justification requirement has been developed into an argument that the courts have the option of balancing the countervailing interests in intrafamily eavesdropping cases.122 For
example, in a domestic relations case, one's expectation of privacy may be outweighed by his spouse's reasonable suspicions
of marital infidelity or child abuse.
While both the "unaided ear" and "privacy intent" caveats
arose in law enforcement contexts, the First District Appellate
Court in Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Companies123 re-

cently recognized both defenses in a private non-family civil suit
for damages under section 14-6.124 Cassidy could be extended to
121. See, e.g., Bianco v. American Broadcasting Cos., 470 F. Supp. 182
(N.D. 111. 1979) (emphasis added). But cf.State v. Forrester, 21 Wash. App.
855, 587 P.2d 179 (1978) (one does not use telephone with intent to keep his
conversations confidential where criminal extortion is involved).
122. 11 GA. L REV. 427, 435 (1977) (since Jones was a wire communication
case, it does not precedentially prevent judicial balancing of privacy interests and the countervailing considerations which prompted the eavesdropping).
123. 60 Ill.
App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d 126 (1978).
124. 60 Ill.
App. 3d at 835, 377 N.E.2d at 129. See note 159 infra.
On May 3, 1979, another approach to the "privacy expectation" caveats
was formulated in Bianco v. American Broadcasting Cos., 470 F. Supp. 182

(N.D. l.1979). In Bianco, plaintiffs were television station employees who
regularly utilized electronic intercommunication equipment in conversing
with technicians and performers. They brought suit against the station, its
owner, and its general manager, alleging that the defendant manager and
his agents intercepted plaintiffs' communications via mechanical eavesdropping devices. Defendants contended that since plaintiffs admitted that
their job performance was subject to observation and supervision, they
could not claim an expectation of privacy under Title III and People v.
Klingenberg. The court recognized that an interceptable oral communication is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2) (1970) in terms of an expectation of
and justification for privacy. 470 F. Supp. at 184. See note 40 supra. It
noted, however, that an "interception" contemplates usage of an eavesdropping device. 470 F. Supp. at 185. See note 38 supra. The court realized,
therefore, that one who knows his communications may be non-mechanically overheard, may still have an expectation that they would not be intercepted with sophisticated devices. 470 F. Supp. at 185.
Similar reasoning impliedly narrowed Klingenberg's "intent to be private" eavesdropping defense. Klingenberg was explained as protecting
only those communications intended to be of a private nature. Id. at 186.
But an Illinois eavesdropping violation also necessitates employment of a
device capable of hearing or recording. See notes 20 & 22 supra. Hence, a
plaintiff, who has no general expectation of privacy, is not precluded from
relief if he intended that his statements were not subject to interception
through eavesdropping equipment. Whether the Klingenberg rationale
survives Bianco remains to be seen. Klingenberg's own facts would be decided differently under Bianco. Defendants who converse with police,
while in custody, obviously do not intend to keep their declarations to themselves. However, such persons may still have expectations that their statements are not being covertly recorded. Notwithstanding Bianco's apparent
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encompass intrafamily eavesdropping. Should this occur, various factual situations would be excluded from Illinois' "absolute" eavesdropping ban. It is not difficult to envision a variation
in the Anonymous facts whereby a custodial parent could implore his child to hold out the telephone to him or let him hold
his ear to the receiver so to overhear the statements of an estranged or former spouse. The "unaided ear" rationale could
also be utilized should one spouse's friend agree to converse
with the other spouse and allow an overhearing.
Regarding the "intent to be of a private nature" requirement
for oral communications, the placing of a device which records
one spouse's end of a telephone conversation as projected into
the room could require the weighing of privacy interests versus
the justification for the eavesdropping. Since this restriction of
the scope of interceptable oral communciations was the product
of judicial flat, the next logical step is to require this "privacy
intent" for telephonic communications. Indeed, the argument
that one can not complain of telephone interceptions unless he
had a reasonable right to expect privacy has been adopted in the
125
judicial opinions of other jurisdictions.
Once this conclusion has been reached, arguments based on
morality and human nature can be injected into the process of
weighing the competing privacy and justification interests involved in intrafamily eavesdropping cases. One argument is
that legislators could not have intended to grant a right of privacy to an adulterous spouse which could further a conspiracy
to break the "moral code relating to human conduct." 126 One's
reasonable belief in a spouse's infidelity could then be used as
an affirmative defense to a statutory civil cause of action. Concern for the health and welfare of one's child could also justify
approval of Klingenberg,by pointing out that federal and state eavesdropping offenses are predicated on the use of devices, the court may have judicially foreclosed employment of an expressly enunciated Title Mlexception
and created an argument for overruling Klingenberg.
125. See, e.g., Beaber v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974),

afd, No. 4187, Ohio App., 5th Dist., Aug. 4, 1975 (unpublished opinion); accord, United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1967); Markham v.
Markham, 272 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 1973) (Melvin, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Goldberg, 208 Pa. Super. Ct. 513, 224 A.2d 91 (1966).
126. Markham v. Markham, 272 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1973) (Melvin, J., dis-

senting). But cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (wrongdoer still
had a reasonable expectation of privacy). Other courts have decided that a
telephone subscriber has a paramount right to intercept communications
on his own telephone so to safeguard his marital status or family relationship. Family members using the phone line are subject to this implied condition, and it is presumed that they understand their own privacy rights
may be invaded by the subscriber's surveillance. See Commonwealth v.
Goldberg, 208 Pa. Super. Ct. 513, 224 A.2d 91 (1966); accord,United States v.
McGuire, 381 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1967). Contra, People v. Snowdy, 237 Cal.

App. 2d 677, 47 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1965).
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eavesdropping upon a custodial parent by an ex-spouse with
reasonable fears. Indeed, there is authority for the position that
a parent deprived of custody of a child not only has a moral or
human right, but a legal right to investigate and ascertain the
conditions under which the child is being cared for. 127 Under
Klingenberg and Cassidy, the foregoing arguments are employable in non-telephonic interception cases. For wire communication interceptions, these contentions depend on court creation
of a "privacy expectation" requirement for telephone conversations. However, this justification rationale is also utilizable in
conjunction with the defense of necessity, which unlike the
aforementioned exceptions, deals with both the use of eavesdropping equipment and telephonic communications.
The Defense of Necessity
Illinois' criminal defense of necessity, 128 while best known
for its application to cases of prison escapes to avoid homosexual attacks and threats of grave bodily harm, 129 also has potential as a civil defense to eavesdropping. In Stamatiou v. United
States Gypsum Company,130 the necessity defense was affirmatively pleaded in a civil action for damages under the Illinois
eavesdropping statute. Stamatiou's facts disclosed a situation
where the defendant company, faced with the prospect of being
victimized by plaintiffs extortion, tape recorded his conversations. The court decided that proof of a violation of the eavesdropping prohibition was a prerequisite to civil recovery, and
therefore held that the criminal defense was usable in a civil action. 13 1 Since the defendants had stated and supported a valid
necessity defense in that they reasonably believed the recordings were necessary to protect the financial well-being of the
132
company, summary judgment was entered for the company.
127. Bodrey v. Cape, 120 Ga. App. 859, 867, 172 S.E.2d 643, 648 (1969).
128. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (1977) provides: "Conduct which would

otherwise be an offense is justifiable by reason of necessity if the accused

was without blame in ... developing the situation and reasonably believed
such conduct was necessary to avoid a In] . .. injury greater than the injury
which might reasonably result from his own conduct."

"Under the necessity approach, the defendant is faced with committing
The theory is not that his
the act which normally constitutes a crime ....
free will was overcome by an outside force, as with duress, but rather that it
was properly exercised to achieve a greater good." United States v.
Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1978).
129. See People v. Unger, 66 Ill. 2d 323, 362 N.E.2d 319 (1977); People v.
Waters, 53 Ill. App. 3d 517, 368 N.E.2d 800 (1977). See generally Gardner, The
Defense of Necessity and the Right To Escape From Prison, 49 S. CAL. L.
REV. 110 (1975).
130. 400 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Mll. 1975), affd, 534 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1976).
131. Id. at 436.
132. Id.
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Stamatiou might be persuasively expanded to encompass a
case of intrafamily surveillance. While the committee comments on the necessity defense do not expressly envision such a
family eavesdropping usage, the Stamatiou facts are not included either. 133 One's marital status or the welfare of a child is
at least as viable a reason for adopting this defense as the corporate profits in Stamatiou. The defendant family member, however, must have a provable'3 reasonable belief that his conduct
was necessary to avoid an injury greater than the one that would
result from his own conduct. The necessity defense must be
135
viewed in light of the factual situation of the particular case.
Under certain circumstances, a court might be convinced that
the potential injury to one's marriage or to the welfare of one's
child outweighed the "injury" to the privacy of the person who is
reasonably suspected of unfaithfulness or neglect or cruelty to
the parties' child. Should the defense of necessity be successfully employed to bar recovery under the eavesdropping statutes, the plaintiff's constitutional and common law tort counts
would take on much greater significance.
The ConstitutionalMandate
At least one commentator has recognized that the plain language of Article I, sections 6 and 12 of the Illinois Constitution,136 creates a specific guarantee of a remedy for unlawful
invasions of privacy, including those based on interceptions of
communications. 1 37 In intrafamily eavesdropping cases within
the scope of the statutory "unaided ear" exception, a constitutional cause of action would apparently save a plaintiff's right of
recovery. The mandate of the constitution was intended to
133. Statutory examples include: (1) the destruction of property to pre-

vent the spread of fire, (2) the jetison of cargo to save a ship, and (3) lost
mountain climbers taking refuge in a dwelling and using provisions. See
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-13 (Smith-Hurd 1964 & Supp. 1978). Cf. City of
Chicago v. Mayer, 56 Ill. 2d 366, 308 N.E.2d 601 (1974) (disorderly conduct
defendant, a third year medical student, was entitled to jury instruction
that his refusal to allow police to remove man with back injury was based
on reasonable belief that moving him would bring about greater injury than
his own misconduct). See generally Huxley, Proposalsand Counterproposals on the Defense of Necessity, 1978 CRIM. L. REP. 141; Williams, Defenses of
General Application: Necessity, 1978 CRIm. L. REP. 122.
134. The necessity defense would be an affirmative defense that the defendant would be obliged to plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-14 (1977).
135. City of Chicago v. Mayer, 56 Ill. 2d 366, 370, 308 N.E.2d 601, 604 (1974).
The doctrine of necessity does not require an emergency to save life, limb,
or health, but applies where the apparent danger is less serious in nature.
Frasher v. State, 8 Md. App. 439, 260 A.2d 656 (1970).
136. ILL. CONST. art I, §§ 6, 12 (1970). See text accompanying notes 31-34

supra.

137. See Illinois and the Right of Privacy, supra note 32, at 101.
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reach non-mechanical eavesdropping, such as listening with an
unaided ear.1'
Two Illinois courts, however, which used the
"unaided ear" as an exception to the eavesdropping statutes,
fully ignored this mandate and justified an unaided overhearing
for lack of a constitutional "interception. 1 39 This doctrine effectively restricts the constitution's scope, and equates it with that
of the eavesdropping statutory scheme.
Two problems with the constitutional cause of action raise
doubts as to its applicability to an intrafamily eavesdropping
case. One difficulty centers upon the remedial base for invasions of privacy. Section 12, the remedy provision for basing a
suit for violations of section 6, made one change in its 1870 predecessor. The earlier provision had stated that every person
ought to find a remedy. 140 The 1970 version imperatively provides that every person shall find a remedy. Despite this change
in verb strength, it has had no substantive effect on Illinois
law.' 41 Moreover, this section has been consistently held to express only a jurisprudential philosophy, rather than mandating
that a remedy be provided to redress all wrongs. 142 Section 12
does not mandate recognition of new recovery methods where
some other remedy is already available. 143 Possible recovery
under the eavesdropping statutes should be sufficient to stymie
efforts at developing a cause of action based solely on the constitution.
Even if section 12 is allowed to form the basis for a suit or if
a plaintiff can directly state a cause of action for interference
with his constitutional privacy rights, an intrafamily eavesdrop138. Constitutional Commentary, ILL. ANN. CONST. art I, § 6 (SmithHurd).
App. 3d 720, 318 N.E.2d 80 (1974);
139. See People v. Szymanski, 22 Ill.
People v. Giannopoulos, 20 Ill.
App. 3d 338, 314 N.E.2d 237 (1974). The requisite "interception" was lacking because the courts interpreted "interception" as that occurring before the communication had been completed. A
communication is completed the moment it springs from the receiver, even
before it reaches the human ear. Id. at 343, 314 N.E.2d at 239. Cf. 3 RECORD
OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTrrTImONAL CONVENTION, at 1530 (1969-70)
[hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS] (if one invites others into a room where
there's a speaker-phone and they all listen to a conversation that the party
on the other end does not know is being overheard, there is no interception).
140. IIZ. CONST. art. I, § 19 (1870).
141. People v. Dowrey, 62 M1l. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975).
142. People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos, 68 IlM. 2d 88, 368 N.E.2d 903 (1977);
2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972); Tyrken
Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 51 Ill.
v. Tyrken, 63 Ill.
App. 3d 199, 379 N.E.2d 804 (1978); DiSanto v. City of WarApp. 3d 931, 376 N.E.2d 288 (1978); Panton v. Demos, 59 Ill.
renville, 59 Ill.
App. 3d 328, 375 N.E.2d 480 (1978); Angelini v. Snow, 58 111. App. 3d 116, 374
App. 3d 915, 350 N.E.2d 886 (1976).
N.E.2d 215 (1978); Steffla v. Stanley, 39 Ill.
See generally Gertz, HortatoryLanguage in the Preambleand Bill of Rights
of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, 6 J. MAR. J. 217 (1973).

App. 3d 915, 350 N.E.2d 886 (1976).
143. See, e.g., Steffla v. Stanley, 39 Ill.
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ping defense is inherent in the definition of a "bill of rights"
wherein the Illinois prohibition is found. The traditional concept of a bill of rights is its concern for the rights of persons
against their government. 144 Indeed, the convention delegates,
in creating actions against non-governmental defendants, were
forced to expressly and deliberately depart from this tradi14 5
tion.
The question of who was to be prohibited from invading personal privacy rights through interceptions of communications
appears to have been settled pursuant to this traditional view.
The Bill of Rights committee proposal restricted the scope of
1
section 6 to include only governmental invasions of privacy. 4
Not all the convention delegates concurred, and counterproposals were offered to extend the purview of the section to inva147
sions of privacy by any person, group, firm, or company.
Since those advocating this change failed in both of their attempts, 148 albeit by narrow margins, this rejection supports the
claim that the constitutional eavesdropping ban does not reach
beyond governmental surveillance into the realm of purely domestic interceptions. 49 Even if the sentiments of the conven144. Leahy, Individual Legal Remedies Against Pollution in Illinois, 3
Loy. Cm. L.J. 1, 6 (1972).
145. Id. See ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (1970) (enforcing healthful environment provision). Cf.id. art. I, §§ 17, 19 (discrimination in employment and
sale or rental of property; discrimination against handicapped in employment and sale and rental of property).
146. 'The new provision creates a direct right to freedom from such invasions of privacy by government or public officials." 6 PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 139, at 32; Gertz, The Unrealized ExpectationsofArticle I, Section 17, 11
J. MAR.J. 283, 315 (1978) (author, Bill of Rights Committee Chairman for the
1970 Constitution, believes that federal and Illinois constitutional privacy
rights deal exclusively with governmental invasions).
147. See 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 139, at 1733. Compare note 182 with
Markham v. Markham, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973) (construing state constitution as extending to intrafamily eavesdropping).
148. See 3 PROCEEDINGS, supranote 139, at 1524-43, 1733-39. One explanation for these defeats was the fact that some delegates had interpreted the
developing Illinois case law as already recognizing the right to sue for all
tortious invasions of privacy in the private sector. Id. at 1735. Dissenting
delegates believed that the judicial development of the tort had been too
slow, and thought that a constitutional mandate would provide impetus for
more rapid development of this novel cause of action. Id. at 1738-40.
149. But cf. Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Cos., 60 Ill.
App. 3d 831,377
N.E.2d 126 (1978) (dictum indicating that a constitutional privacy cause of
action could have been stated for interceptions between private individuals
or entities).
A recent decision, Bianco v. American Broadcasting Cos., 470 F. Supp.
182 (N.D. 1l1. 1979), should reinforce the position of intrafamily and other
non-governmental eavesdroppers. Article I, section 6 was determined to be
a restriction solely on governmental activity. Id. at 187. This holding was
supported by analogy to the fourth amendment to the federal constitution,
which is not a constraint on private action. Scrutiny was also directed to
the remarks of convention delegates, especially Mr. John E. Dvorak of the
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tion dissenters are adopted in the future, the constitutional
modifier "unreasonable" stands ready for the implementation of
the same "privacy expectation" and "necessity" arguments that
barred the statutory cause of action. In such situations, plain-

tiffs may be forced to resort to a cause of action for tortious invasion of privacy.
Tortious Invasion of Privacy
Where a cause of action for eavesdropping-based privacy invasions is recognized, 5 0 standards for recovery are not stringent. Damages for mental suffering are awardable, absent
physical injury, because the intrusion is essentiallly into one's
subjective mental solitude. 151 Communication of garnered information to third parties is not required for recovery, though
this factor is important in the assessment of damages. 152 There
is a division of authority on the prima facie elements of this tort.
One view is that eavesdropping itself, the actual aural acquisition, is needed, and the mere placing of a tap or other recording
153
device is a non-actionable preparation for the interception.
The contrary position advocates that the lack of human hearing
should not be fatal and that recovery may be had for the trespasBill of Rights Committee, who had stated that section 6 "doesn't apply to
private circumstances between private individuals." 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 139, at 1524.
Plaintiffs argued that the adoption of the Article I, section 12 "every person shall find a remedy for all wrongs to his privacy" language meant that
section 6 reached private eavesdropping. The court believed that section 12
covered interceptions not included within section 6, namely private surveillance. 470 F. Supp. at 187. Conceivably, a suit based solely on section 12
could be stated. However, this provision has consistently been held by the
Illinois appellate judiciary not to create a cause of action. See cases cited in
note 142 supra. See also Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill. App. 3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54
(1979) (sections 6 and 12 do not grant causes of action for invasions of privacy by non-governmental defendants).
150. A number of courts support the general conclusion that an action for
invasion of privacy can be based on eavesdropping activities. Dietemann v.
Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971); Fowler v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 343
F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965); McDaniel v. Atlantic Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga.
App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810 (1939); Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46
(1931); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Nader v.
General Motors Co., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970);
LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963);
Marks v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 460 Pa. 73, 331 A.2d 424 (1975); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973); Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d
564 (1958). Contra, State ex rel. North Pac. Lumber Co. v. Unis, 282 Or. 457,
579 P.2d 1291 (1978).
151. E.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 111, 206 A.2d 239, 241
(1964); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971).
152. E.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249-50 (9th Cir. 1971).
153. LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 134, 201 N.E.2d 533,
538 (1963); accord, Marks v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 460 Pa. 73, 331 A.2d 424
(1975).
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sory intrusion in placing the device. 5 4 The latter, more liberal,
rationale could be employed in a case where a spouse actually
enters the separate abode of his estranged spouse in order to
effectuate the interception. Absent a trespass into a separate
dwelling, adoption of the viewpoint requiring proof of an aural
acquisition may be necessary to state a cause of action for intrafamily eavesdropping within the family home.
Should a plaintiff be relegated to a suit in tort, his request
for recognition of a heretofore unknown Illinois cause of action
for tortious intrafamily invasion of telecommunications privacy 5 5 is susceptible to attack. A primary factor which could
retard its development is the almost total absence of sister state
precedent. The single reported appellate opinion dealing with
156
such an invasion is LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Telephone Company,
in which a woman's recovery against the defendant company
was predicated on its assisting her estranged spouse in his telephonic eavesdropping. The court, though deciding in favor of
the plaintiff, was careful to narrow its opinion to the instant
facts, and noted that since the parties were separated, the woman had a right to communicate in private without interceptions
by her estranged husband.5 7 Le Crone did not deal with eavesdropping between cohabiting family members in the family
home. Nevertheless, in dictum, the court did concede that "as to
privacy rights, husband and wife are not on the same footing as
strangers.' 1 58 Hence, the sole judicial pronouncement on purely
domestic interceptions leans against recovery of damages.
154. See Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 111,206 A.2d 239, 242 (1964).

155. While Illinois appellate courts have recognized the tort of invasion
of privacy, it is really four separate torts: (1) intrusion into a plaintiffs solitude or seclusion, (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about
a plaintiff, (3) publicity which places a plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye, and (4) appropriation of a plaintiff's name or likeness for advantage.
See Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALr.L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). For a discussion of
the judicial interpretation of these four torts in Illinois, reference should be
made to Illinois and the Right of Privacy, supranote 32. Invasions of privacy through eavesdropping are most likely covered by the "intrusion into
solitude" tort. Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 111, 206 A.2d 239, 241
(1964).
156. 120 Ohio App. 129, 201 N.E.2d 533 (1963). In LeCrone, at the request
of the plaintiffs husband, the defendAnt company connected an extension
to the phone in the woman's abode and placed it in the man's residence.
Direct recovery against the company was denied when it was conceded that
the company neither listened to her conversations nor trespassed into the
woman's abode to effect the interception. The connection had been made
by means of a "jumper" at the defendant's central office. Relief depended,
therefore, on a showing that the defendant gave material aid to the husband
in his invasion of privacy. Since there was evidence that the husband listened in, the central issue was whether the woman had a right of privacy
against her husband.
157. Id. at 137, 201 N.E.2d at 539.
158. Id. at 136, 201 N.E.2d at 539.
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In 1978, the contended existence of a common law cause of
action for tortious invasion of telecommunications privacy was
adjudicated in a non-family setting in Cassidy v. American
Broadcasting Companies.159 Should an Illinois court be confronted with a purely domestic interception between cohabitants, competing theories on individual versus family privacy
would clash. Supporting the individual privacy rationale would
be the policy, which, as evidenced by the eavesdropping statutes, disfavors private interceptions without excluding intrafamily surveillance. The opposing policy argument centers
on the theme that courts should not invade the family social order and thereby disrupt domestic tranquility. 160 From this basis
stem contentions that rights of privacy may162be qualified by the
1
familial ties, 16 or even completely waived.
159. 60 Ill. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d 126 (1978). In Cassidy, during a police
investigation of a massage parlor, television crewmen made visual recordings of officers and non-mechanically overheard their conversations with alleged prostitutes. Plaintiff officers failed to state a possible constitutional
privacy count. Id. at 837, 377 N.E.2d at 130. Suit was brought under the
eavesdropping statute's civil provision and in tort for invasion of privacy.
After ruling for the defendants on the eavesdropping defenses of "unaided
ear" and "intent to keep private," the basis for tortious invasion of privacy
recovery was scrutinized.
The court cited and explained Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th
Cir. 1971), which held that there is a cause of action for invasion of telecommunications privacy. See 60 Ill.
App. 3d at 838, 377 N.E.2d at 132. Plaintiffs
were denied relief, however, because they were public as distinct from private individuals. Id. Eavesdropping was not excluded from the realm of
actionable privacy invasions. Hence, interceptions of private person's communications by a private individual may give rise to a cause of action. If the
Illinois Supreme Court has occasion to adopt this rationale, it will be confronted with the case of Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d

1006, 345 N.E.2d 37 (1976), which employed language limiting actions for invasions of privacy to those where a plaintiff's name or likeness has been
commercially exploited. See Illinois and the Right of Privacy, supra note
32, at 100. Compare Bank of Ind. v. Tremunde, 50 Ill. App. 3d 480, 365 N.E.2d

295 (1977) (assumed Illinois Supreme Court would recognize cause of action for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion) with Kelly v. Franco, 72 Ill.

App. 3d 642, 391 N.E.2d 54 (1979) (refusing to recognize tort of unreasonable
intrusion).
160. See Comment, Domestic Tranquility and the Right of Privacy, 18
S.W. TEx. L. REv. 121, 129-33 (1977) (notes that the family is itself a quasijudicial institution and often must be the sole arbiter in intrafamily disputes).
161. See Interspousal Surveillance Immunity, supra note 7, at 211 (author fears stretching a consent by imputation could bar interspousal privacy invasion suits); Markham v. Markham, 272 So. 2d 813, 814 (Fla. 1973)
(Melvin, J., dissenting) (no privacy right in adulterous spouse); accord,
Beaber v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974). Compare People
v. Appelbaum, 277 A.D. 43, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807, aff'd, 301 N.Y. 738, 95 N.E.2d 401
(1950) (privacy rights are subordinated by an implied condition that a telephone will not be used to the detriment of the subscriber's marital status)
with Plotkin v. Rabinowitz, 54 Misc. 2d 550, 283 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1967)
(statutory eavesdropping amendment overruled Appelbaum but left open
issue of whether this reasoning could be employed in an invasion of privacy
suit).
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The individual privacy thesis is fortifiable, however, by attacking the basic premises of the contrary position. Countless
courts have held that when family cases reach the courts, domestic tranquility has already been destroyed and therefore
there is no reason for court reluctance in dealing with intrafamily disputes. 163 Further, the contention that a belief in a

spouse's adulterous motives in some way justifies interception
of communications is difficult to square with judicial holdings

that wrongdoers retain privacy rights. 16

Since Illinois family

members have reasonable expectations of privacy in search and

seizure contexts, 165 they should have protectable privacy expectations in their communications. From the foregoing, arguments
favor recognizing a right of suit for intrafamily eavesdropping,
though what little precedent or dictum there is is to the con-

trary.
If this cause of action is recognized, defenses of privilege
and immunity may limit its efficacy. The arguments employed
in defending a statutory suit with the criminal defense of necessity 166 could also be utilized under the tort privileges of necessity 1 67 and justification. 1 6 8 A greater barrier is Illinois'
codification of common law interspousal tort immunity, which
prevents a spouse from recovering against the other for torts to
the person committed during coverture. 169 The statute does not
162. See, e.g., Bodrey v. Cape, 120 Ga. App. 859, 172 S.E.2d 643 (1969) (implied waiver of privacy right in interspousal eavesdropping child custody
dispute); Commonwealth v. Goldberg, 208 Pa. Super. Ct. 513, 224 A.2d 91
(1966) (subscriber can eavesdrop because of paramount right outweighing
waived privacy rights).
163. See Danforth v. Planned Parenthood of Mo., 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976);
Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898, 901 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (interspousal
eavesdropping case).
164. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (wrongdoer had
reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone booth). Indeed, what would
be the purpose of Title III's restrictions on law enforcement, if suspected
criminals had waived their privacy rights because of evil deeds or motives?
165. See, e.g., People v. Nunn, 55 Ill. 2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 904 (1974) (mother's third-party consent to search of son's
room held insufficient).
166. See text accompanying notes 128-35 supra.
167. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 36
(4th ed. 1971); Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict IntentionalInvasions
of Interests, 39 HAxv. L. REV. 307 (1926).
168. See, e.g., Sindle v. New York City Transit Auth., 33 N.Y.2d 293, 307
N.E.2d 245, 352 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1973).
169. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 1001 (1977); Comment, Wife Abuse: The Failure of Legal Remedies, 11 J. MAR. J. 549, 569-73 (1978). See also Polelle, Illinois Family Immunity, 55 CHI. B. REc. 219 (1974); 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 590
(1970). In a parent-child suit, a family immunity defense would present
minimal problems as the eavesdropping-based privacy invasion is an intentional tort. Any remaining vestige of parental tort immunity does not encompass wilful, wanton, or intentional conduct. Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. 2d
608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956). See also Casey, Trend of Interspousaland Paren-
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distinguish between intent and negligence, but applies to all
torts to the person. "Person" has not been definitively interpreted by Illinois courts in the context of the immunity statute.
If "person" is restricted to the physical person of a plaintiff, then
damage awards for mental suffering should survive. If "person"
means mental as well as physical person, it is conceivable that
interspousal immunity could completely bar recovery for technical invasions of privacy.
Wiretapped spouses, limited to a tort action, would be
forced to depend on continuation of the restrictive view of immunity taken by the Illinois judiciary. Buttressing the argument for a narrow interpretation of "person" is the fact that
prior to the legislature's present action, the Illinois Supreme
Court had abolished the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. 170 Recent cases have continued to chastize the legislature's support for this outmoded concept.1 71 Taken in this light,
it is probable that if a plaintiff's statutory and constitutional
counts were stymied by the defendant, Illinois courts would not
leave a spouse remediless solely by interpreting "person" as
contemplating something more than physical injury.
A restrictive interpretation of "person" could be dangerous,
however. The only real intentional tort to the physical person is
battery, and many actionable touchings are offensive rather
than physically harmful. They are offensive to the subjective
mental solitude in the same manner as an invasion of telecommunications privacy. It is doubtful that the General Assembly
could have statutorily removed an effective remedy for severely
physical wife abuse, while allowing litigation of petty interspousal claims of assaults in the form of threats of abuse, inflictions of mental distress, and invasions of privacy. Yet that
would result if "person" is restricted to invasions of physical
well-being.
Batteries which result from offensive touchings appear to be
torts to the person. They commence with body contact. The injury, however, is to the "mental person" in terms of embarrassment or hurt feelings. In invasions of privacy, the injury is to
the same mental solitude, and should be included as a "tort to
the person," like offensive-touching batteries. Should a court
consider the "physical and mental person" standard plausible,
tal Immunity, 45 INS. COUNSEL J. 321 (1978); Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 891 (1970).
Intrafamily immunities are not employable as defenses to civil causes of
action based on eavesdropping statutes. Remington v. Remington, 393 F.
Supp. 898, 902 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
170. Brandt v. Keller, 413 Ill.
503, 109 N.E.2d 729 (1952).
171. See, e.g., Steffla v. Stanley, 39 Ill.
App. 3d 915, 919, 350 N.E.2d 886, 889

(1976).
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Illinois' statutory interspousal immunity could be the final defense needed to render a wiretapped spouse completely remediless.
ADMISSIBILITY OF EAVESDROPPING EVIDENCE

Distinct from civil suits for damages or injunctive relief is
the problem of suppression of evidence derived from unlawful
eavesdropping. The United States Supreme Court, in a nonfamily setting, has indicated that circumstances under which
suppression is required are not necessarily coterminous with
findings of criminal surveillance violations. 172 Courts confronted with the attempted introduction of eavesdropping evidence in domestic relations disputes have reasoned that the
exclusionary rule is the least severe of the interception remedies, and hence suppression of tainted recordings or transcripts
thereof should be liberally granted. 173 This approach has been
followed more strictly in cases of dissolution of marriage, however, than in child custody disputes.
Dissolution of Marriage
Separating pure divorce cases from those involving child
custody, the jurisdictions that have dealt with the former situation have refused to admit wiretap evidence offered to prove divorce grounds. In Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker,174 a man, though
cohabiting with his wife, arranged for the placing of an extension to the family telephone in his business office. He obtained
recordings of the woman's conversations with her paramour.
On the issue of the admissibility of these recordings where adultery was pleaded in bar to a state law alimony claim, the North
Carolina Supreme Court held the tapes were to be excluded
pursuant to the Title III exclusionary rule.175 Similarly, a New
172. E.g., United States v. Giordana, 416 U.S. 505, 529 (1974). It must be
noted at the outset that it would be the statutory exclusionary rules of Title
III and the Illinois scheme which would be employed in requesting exclusion of evidence. The United States Constitution has never been construed
to require exclusion of evidence seized by private individuals. Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); 26 FLA. L. REV. 166, 167 (1973).
173. E.g., In re Marriage of Lopp, 370 N.E.2d 977, 981 (Ind. App. 1977), vacated,378 N.E.2d 414 (Ind. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1023 (1979). In addition to the divorce and child custody areas, eavesdropping evidence
problems could surface in criminal conversation suits. See, e.g., White v.
Longo, 190 Neb. 703, 212 N.W.2d 84 (1973).

174. 290 N.C. 373, 226 S.E.2d 347 (1976).
175. Id. at 381, 226 S.E.2d at 352 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970)).
Simpson was distinguished on the ground that its eavesdropping took place
within the marital residence, and involved a suit for damages rather than an
evidentiary problem. 290 N.C. at 381, 226 S.E.2d at 352.
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York court, in Connin v. Connin,176 a Simpson situation where a
husband tapped the marital home telephone without his wife's
consent, refused to decide whether Simpson's Title III statutory
interpretation should be restricted to suits for civil damages or
encompassed all Title III issues. Instead state eavesdropping
law was utilized to suppress tape recordings of conversations
177
between the wife and other men.
There is no Illinois case law in this narrow area. This should
not be perplexing in light of the state's stringent eavesdropping
ban. On a national scale, however, Illinois should be at the forefront in requests for excluding evidence used to directly prove
divorce grounds. Where no-fault divorce concepts have solidified, mere curiosity has replaced proof of marital misconduct as
the compelling reason for interspousal surveillance. Eavesdropping might be employed to determine the reasons for obtaining
a divorce. Nevertheless, in terms of the proof of grounds, where
exclusionary principles take on importance, interceptions appear unnecessarily risky. They open the possibility of criminal
penalties and civil redress for an operation that, because of ease
of dissolution of marriages, gives no real legal benefit to the
eavesdropper.
In Illinois, one of only three states that rely solely on proven
marital fault for dissolutions, 17 this eavesdropping risk might
have to be accepted if a spouse is without other means of developing the proof needed to dissolve his or her failing marriage.
Indeed, it has been espoused in well-considered dictum that
when a party violates the marriage contract within the marital
home and is sufficiently secretive so as to avoid public knowledge, the other party is placed in an indefensible position. To
deny admission of eavesdropping evidence would deny this person the only creditable matter that he could obtain. 179 So while
no court has admitted such evidence in divorce proceedings, the
rationale has been developed for future offers, and rests, like
many of the other eavesdropping justifications, in necessity
under the circumstances.
Child Custody
When child custody is at issue, uncertainties originate in the
supposition that all available information should be considered
176. 89 Misc. 2d 548, 392 N.Y.S.2d 530 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
177. Id. at 549, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 531 (construing N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 250.00 et
seq. &N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 4506 (McKinney 1975)).
178. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 401-02 (1977); Freed &Foster, Divorce In The
Fifty States: An Outline, 11 FAM. L.Q. 297, 300 (1977).
179. Beaber v. Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 101, 322 N.E.2d 910, 915 (1974),
affd, No. 4187, Ohio App., 5th Dist., Aug. 4,1975.
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so to ascertain the "best interests of the child."' 8 0 Two reported
opinions conflict. The Title III-like Florida eavesdropping statutes' 8 1 and constitutional exclusionary rule 182 were construed in
Markham v. Markham183 to not implicitly include a domestic relations exception which would allow admission of unlawfully
taped recordings. 8 4 In reaching a contrary conclusion more
consistent with domestic relations than criminal explications, a
New York Family Court in Berk v. Berk,185 proclaimed that
where child custody is a paramount issue, the court should consider the best interests of the child and therefore demand all
available information. 18 6 It recognized that Mr. Berk's telephonic interceptions and recordings contravened criminal sanctions. Resolving the problem with a family law approach,
however, the court ignored state and federal eavesdropping exclusionary rules and concluded that while admitting the tapes it
would also consider what effect the father's illegal conduct had
187
on the children.
On appeal, the Appellate Division did not pass on the precise point decided below-whether the need for information in
child custody cases outweighs the criminality in its obtainment.
Instead the court, without reversing, remanded on the issue of a
possible acquiescence in the recordings. 88 "Consent" had been
disputed by the parties but not decided below. The lower court
had considered the issue immaterial in light of its expansive
180. See, e.g., Marcus v. Marcus, 24 Ill. App. 3d 401,406, 320 N.E.2d 581, 584
(1974); Johnson v. Johnson, 25 A.D.2d 672, 672, 268 N.Y.S.2d 403, 405 (1966);
Brosky & Alford, Sharpening Solomon's Sword: Current ConsiderationsIn
Child Custody Cases, 81 DICK. L. REV. 683 (1977); Foster & Freed, Life With
Father,11 FAM. L.Q. 321 (1977); Schiller, Child Custody, Evolution of Current Criteria,26 DE PAUL L. REV. 241, 246-49 (1977); Taylor, Child Custody
Problems In Illinois,24 DE PAUL L. REV. 521 (1975). But see Comment, Child
Custody Best Interests of Children vs. Constitutional Rights of Parents, 81
DICK. L. REV. 733 (1977).
181. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 934.06 (West 1976).
182. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (1971) provides that the "right of the people to
be secure ... against ... interception of private communications by any
means, shall not be violated.. . . Information obtained in violation of this
right shall not be admissible in evidence."
183. 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973).
184. Id. at 814.
185. 95 Misc. 2d 33, 406 N.Y.S.2d 247 (Fain. Ct. 1978). In Berk, a custodial
father taped telephone conversations between his estranged spouse and
children. As part of the divorce proceeding, permanent custody was at issue and the woman moved to suppress the tapes on the ground that the
recordings had not been consented to. The father believed that the children
had legally acquiesced in the interceptions.
186. Id. at 34, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 248.
187. Id. But cf. CAL. CirV. CODE § 4361 (West 1977) (evidence obtained
through eavesdropping is inadmissible in domestic relations proceedings).
188. 67 A.D.2d 708, 412 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1979).
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pro-admission conclusion. 189 Since the primary issue was temporarily left undecided, theories remain available for opposing
as well as supporting the offer of eavesdropping evidence as direct proof in child custody adjudication.
In Fears v. Fears,190 the single Illinois appellate opinion
dealing with intrafamily eavesdropping, the court was confronted with a decree awarding custody to a father who had successfully offered a tape recording which his seventeen year old
brother had made of a conversation between himself and his sister-in-law. No objection had been made by the woman's counsel
at trial, and the trial judge considered the tapes, in which the
woman admitted involvement with drugs. 19 1 The appellate
court reversed stating that where the best interests of the child
192
are concerned, strict rules of evidence need not be followed.
The application of this principle in Fears,however, did not comport with the contention that all available evidence should be
considered. Instead the court held that while failure to object to
improper evidence ordinarily waives admission error, the fact
that custody was in dispute prevented this technicality from
barring the reviewing court from determining the admissibility
of the evidence. 193 The tapes were found to be within the purview of the Illinois eavesdropping exclusionary rule and therefore suppressable. 194
With Berk at least temporarily supporting the admission of
illegally obtained evidence, the question remains whether Illinois courts would abandon Fearsfor this novel approach. Berk
makes reasonably good sense because while admitting the surveillance evidence, it also considers the eavesdropper's illegal
conduct as it affects the child. Since the surveillance activity is
to be weighed in the custody hearing, eavesdropping should be
restricted to cases where an interceptor truly believes his conduct is necessary to protect his child's best interests. Otherwise
the eavesdropper would not accept the risks of losing his custody claim because of his own illegal activity.
Recent modifications in Illinois custody law provide that
custody should be determined in accordance with the best interests of the child. 195 A court may not consider conduct of a pro189. Id. at 708, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 581.

190. 5 IlM. App. 3d 610, 283 N.E.2d 709 (1972). In Fears,a custodial mother
moved to modify and fix more definite child support obligations. Her former husband sought a custody change, which was granted by the lower
court. Id. at 611, 283 N.E.2d at 710.
191. Id. at 613, 283 N.E.2d at 711.

192. Id.
193. Id. at 614, 283 N.E.2d at 711.
194. Id.

195. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 602(a) (1977).
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posed custodian which does not affect his relationship to the
child.196 Modifications are allowed only in situations where the
child's present environment seriously endangers his physical,
mental, moral, or emotional health. 197 Published comments to
the Uniform Act that was adopted in Illinois explained these
changes as removing fault notions from custody adjudications,
and concluded that there is no reason to encourage parties to
spy on one another in order to discover marital or sexual misconduct for use in a custody contest. 9 8 Since discovery of extramarital sexual activity has been the primary purpose of
interspousal eavesdropping, the commentary's mandate would
seem to exclude the major reason for wiretapping. In De Franco
v. De Franco,199 however, marital infidelity was resurrected as a
factor in custody determinations and modifications. 20 0 This reinstated sexual suspicion as the most prevalent reason for intrafamily surveillance.
The De Franco court, in affirming a custody change to a father, concluded that an adulterous relationship by one divorced
parent can negatively affect a child's moral health. 20 1 Not only
can adultery be employed when modification is requested it
may also be utilized as a relevant factor in the original determination. 20 2 While there now appear to be comparable reasons for
interspousal eavesdropping in New York and Illinois, it is doubtful that an Illinois court could be persuaded to abandon the
Fearsrationale. It would be pointed out that Berk is an opinion
of one family court judge which may well be reversed on its
pending appeal. More important, New York's one-party consent
exception 20 3 contravenes any thought of analogizing the two
states' eavesdropping laws in light of Illinois' "unqualified" surveillance ban.
A third child custody position has been advanced. It supports the use of eavesdropping evidence in impeaching a
spouse's testimony in a custody proceeding. In Beaber v.
196. Id. § 602(b).
197. Id. § 610.
198. DESK GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 43 (1974).
199. 67 Ill. App. 3d 760, 384 N.E.2d 997 (1979).
200. Id. at 768, 384 N.E.2d at 1002. Illinois courts under prior marriage
legislation had awarded and modified custody to avoid the effect on children
of sexual relationships. See Gehn v. Gehn, 51 Ill. App. 3d 946, 367 N.E.2d 508
(1977); Anagnostopoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 22 Ill. App. 3d 479, 317 N.E.2d
681 (1974).

201. 67 Ill. App. 3d at 767, 384 N.E.2d at 1001.
202. Id. Since the original custody determination had been by stipulation, the court decided the case on a modification theory and also as if the
proceeding was one for an original determination. Id.
203. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 415 N.Y.S.2d 68 (A.D. 1979).
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Beaber,20 4 tape recordings were admitted to impeach the testimony of a woman as to both parents' alleged misconduct, despite acknowledgments that federal and state eavesdropping
laws had been violated. 20 5 While the Illinois exclusionary rule
does not seem to contemplate an exception for impeachment,
neither did the statutes involved in Beaber. The Illinois rule,
though it appears steadfast, has never been challenged on impeachment grounds in a domestic relations case. Beaber is the
sole custody impeachment precedent. It can be buttressed by
observing the willingness of other courts to narrow their exclusionary holdings to direct evidence so as to not foreclose offers
to impeach testimony.2° 6 Should Berk and Beaber not convince
a court, eavesdroppers, as a last resort, would be forced to extend the civil damage defenses to admissibility controversies,
and place themselves within the realm of one of the exceptions.
CONCLUSION

Perplexities permeating judicial review of intrafamily
eavesdropping stem from the unwillingness of some courts to
remedy invasions of privacy in what is considered to be the most
private of our modem institutions, the marital union and the
204. 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974), aff'd, No. 4187, Ohio App., 5th
Dist., Aug. 4, 1975. In Beaber, a Simpson situation where the eavesdropping
took place in the marital residence between cohabiting spouses, the lower
court hinted that the tape recordings were employable as direct evidence.
See 41 Ohio Misc. at 99, 322 N.E.2d at 913. This was modified on appeal to
usage solely in contradicting the woman's statements under oath. Beaber v.
Beaber, No. 4187, slip op. at 17 (Ohio App., 5th Dist., Aug. 4, 1975).
205. Id. Cf. In re Marriage of Lopp, 370 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. App. 1977), vacated, 378 N.E.2d 414 (Ind. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1023 (1979). The intermediate appellate court held that eavesdropping evidence is always
inadmissible, regardless of the circumstances. See 370 N.E.2d at 980. On
appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court noted the distinction between using
eavesdropping evidence directly and for impeachment purposes. See 378
N.E.2d at 421. The court allowed tapes of wiretapped telephone conversations to be used to dispel a non-custodial woman's contention that she had
been coerced into signing a court approved temporary custody agreement.
It was alleged that the father had made these recordings and had
threatened to expose the woman's sexual conduct to her first husband, who
would then most likely seek custody of a child of this first marriage. The
woman claimed that she was prejudiced by allowing the judge to grant permanent custody after considering the tapes for the coercion claim. A presumption against trial court bias was employed to conclude that the tapes
had not been considered by the judge in the custody determination itself.
Even if they had been so used, the evidence derived from the tapes was
held to be merely cumulative to the great weight of other evidence, and

therefore not prejudicial. Id. at 424. See also United States v. Quintana, 508
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1975) (use of harmless error doctrine in admitting evidence in an interception of communications situation).

206. See, e.g., Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290 N.C. 373, 382, 226 S.E.2d
347, 353 (1976).
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family. 20 7 While the application of criminal eavesdropping laws
to private domestic disputes has been dominated by uncertainty
of purpose and propriety, 20 8 contentions that these prohibitions
should never attach to intrafamily surveillance form only a part
of the problem. Even treating the family as a "single entity,"
thereby qualifying individual privacy rights, fails to resolve the
crucial issue of whether the courts should review the expectations of privacy and the justifications for invading it by weighing
the circumstances of the particular family involved.
By raising claims of "best interests of the child," "necessity," and "reasonableness of privacy expectations," an eavesdropper will force a court to delve into the heart of the family
concept as it exists in the scrutinized family. There is no concensus on whether spouses have unlimited rights to know
whether their partners are being unfaithful. Many families
would disagree on the extent parental control rights should interfere with their children's expectations of telecommunications
privacy. One eavesdropper may wiretap for vicious self-serving
motives, possibly arising out of a hideous need for retribution.
Another may do so for the noble purpose of protecting his
child's welfare or rehabilitating a failing marital union or family
structure. In cases of intrafamily controversy, courts should
have dispositional powers so to effect rehabilitation rather than
retribution. 20 9 When the judicial system realizes that families
have differing values as to privacy and family unity, courts may
be forced to legitimate eavesdropping activity in the context of
the specific competing individual and family interests involved.
While the federal and Illinois remedial devices purport to
provide ease of access to civil redress of interceptions of communications and to foreclose admission of eavesdropping evidence, various exceptions and interpretative restrictions may
instill a degree of confidence in one contemplating intrafamily
eavesdropping. It must be warned, however, that the array of
rebuttal expostulations must withstand thorough examination
by the Illinois judiciary 210 before the "dirty business" of eaves207. See InterspousalSurveillance Immunity, supra note 7, at 212.
208. Id. at 211 (author discussed anomaly of the sparsity of intrafamily

interception criminal prosecutions in light of Justice Department determination that eighty per cent of eavesdropping complaints involved domestic
disputes). In addition to those previously considered, the following authorities point out the uncertainty of applying criminal law to domestic eavesdropping situations: 27 BuFFALo L. REV. 139 (1977); 4 N. Ky. L. REV. 389
(1977).
209. H. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAW 305 (1976); Ketcham, The Juvenile Court,40
Soc. SERV. REV. 283, 284-85 (1966). See also Parnas, Prosecutorialand Judicial Handlingof Family Violence, 9 Cumx. L. BuLL. 733 (1973); Schwartz, The
Serious Marital Offender: Tort Law as a Solution, 6 FAM. L.Q. 219 (1972).

210. The law of intrafamily eavesdropping is in conflict. Practitioners
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dropping can be cleansed by its litigation in intrafamily scenarios.
Jeffrey A. Ryva

should avoid oversimplistic appraisals of both state and federal legislation
and judicial decisions. See Kratz v. Kratz, 48 U.S.LW. 2173 (E.D. Pa. Aug.
23, 1979). In Kratz, a husband, suspicious of his wife's extramarital activities, asked his attorney whether it would be legal to attach an eavesdropping device to the family telephone. The attorney discovered Simpson v.
Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974), and concluded that the man's proposed wiretapping would not violate federal law.
The woman and her paramour brought a Title m civil action for damages
against the man and his attorney. The district court denied both defendants' Simpson-based motions to dismiss. Hence, an attorney, though he
never actually intercepts a communication, can by merely advising his client that interspousal surveillance is lawful and employing garnered information in divorce pleadings be held monetarily liable.
Uncertainties in the law of intrafamily eavesdropping may themselves
be utilized as affirmative defenses. The plaintiffs in Kratz had moved for
summary judgment as to liability. Title M civil recovery depended on proof
of "wilful" violation of the wiretapping ban. The court expressly rejected
the holding in Simpson, but denied plaintiffs' motion. A genuine issue of
material fact existed as to the reasonableness of the husband's and the attorney's reliance upon Simpson. The court believed that at this time the
Simpson opinion was the voice of the federal government advising the man
and his attorney that their contemplated conduct would not render them
liable under Title m. If the fact-finder finds the defendants' reliance on
Simpson to have been reasonable, the court concluded that it would entitle
them to the affirmative defense of reasonable reliance upon an official, but
erroneous, statement of federal law.

